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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the outcomes of competition in settings with incomplete and costly
information.
The first two chapters explore in depth the incentives of firms to influence the amount
of information available to consumers prior to their purchasing decisions. In many markets,
firms have the potential to make their offers intentionally difficult for consumers to compare,
for example, by adopting confusing presentation frames. We find that higher competition
does not necessarily lead to better market outcomes for consumers.
The last chapter addresses a more general question as to whether competition leads to
more or less informed decisions per unit of costs, in the setting where information is costly
to obtain. I compare the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems of law enforcement and
characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for one scheme to dominate another and
provide additional arguments in favor of the inquisitorial system.
The idea for the research questions studied in chapters one and two arose from observing
the complexities of consumer credit offers which emerged from increasing competition in the
banking sector in Ukraine. The presence of multiple clauses in credit contracts limited the
extent to which credit offers could be compared and made the actual rate paid by consumers
frequently far higher than the rate advertised on the initial publicity. Consider, for example,
the following consumer loan conditions and try determine which consumer product carries
the lower price: a 1.67% monthly interest rate with a 2.25% monthly commission on the
total sum of credit, or a 12% annual interest rate, 11% upfront fee plus a 1.99% monthly
commission on the total sum of credit including the upfront fee?
In addition the spread between publicized and actual effective interest rates varied from
bank to bank. Despite there being a number of active banks competing in prices, the effective
Abstract 2
interest rates far from reflected the actual costs, even if controlling for the associated country
risks. The interest rates were quite dispersed for relatively homogeneous credit offers, which
in turn suggests that the market outcome was unlikely to be competitive. Such examples are
not limited to Ukraine and to the banking sector. Hardly comparable offers can be observed
in various sectors such as electricity markets, mobile communications market, electronic
goods, etc.
My research addresses the effects of this consumers, and the motivations of firms to
undertake strategies that limit consumers’ abilities to compare offers. When choosing the
best deals, consumers look for the most advantageous combination of price and product
match. Consumers differ in the amount of information they possess about prices and product
features. In an oligopoly setting, we study the incentives of firms to make one or several
dimensions of their offers intentionally confusing.
Firms can make their pricing structures and product features difficult to evaluate in order
to limit the comparability of their own offers with competing ones. The mixed strategy
equilibrium results in positive mark-ups. We analyze the strategic choices of firms and the
relevant policy implications in three different settings: in markets with homogeneous, and
markets with vertically and horizontally differentiated goods.
The first chapter of this thesis provides experimental evidence on the strategic limitation
of price comparison by competing firms in a setting with homogenous products.
We develop a generalized theoretical framework following Carlin (2009) that accommo-
dates both homogenous and vertically differentiated markets, and show that firms adapt to
the competitiveness of the market by making price comparison costly for consumers, thereby
departing from the concept of Bertrand competition. We then solve a simplified version of
the game theoretical model and derive testable statistics on the effects of changes in market
structure on equilibrium outcomes.
We test these predictions using a laboratory based experiment. The experimental data
supports the theoretical predictions of the model. In particular, an increase in the number
of competing firms leads to more costly price comparison for consumers. As a result, the
share of uninformed consumers increases, which leads to higher average prices. Informed
consumers still benefit from an increase in competition and pay lower prices. The firms that
Abstract 3
charge higher prices tend to make it more costly for consumers to compare prices, while the
firms that charge lower prices tend to make the comparison easier for consumers.
Furthermore, imposing an upper bound on the cost of comparison that firms can choose
lowers market prices both for informed and uninformed consumers and reduces price disper-
sion. As an implication, a policy that limits the extent to which firms can make it costly for
consumers to compare several offers would increase consumer welfare.
Chapter 2 extends the existing theoretical framework to accommodate horizontally dif-
ferentiated products. Firms can choose to make their pricing structure and product features
easier or harder to compare against competing offers. We find that price complexity increases
with the price charged while product complexity decreases. For a high degree of product
differentiation, there is a medium range of prices for which firms choose to make their offers
fully transparent.
A higher number of firms shifts firms’ choices towards complex prices and a transparent
product match. The frequency of choosing fully transparent offers is non-monotonic in the
number of firms; it increases with the number of firms when there are few firms in the market
and decreases otherwise.
We further discuss relevant policy implications targeted at increasing market trans-
parency. Increasing market transparency on the price dimension results in lower market
prices but potentially worse product matches for consumers, while regulating transparency
on the product dimension increases market prices but results in a better match. Welfare
assessment therefore should take into account the importance of product matches for con-
sumers.
The motivation for the research question that I explore in chapter three originates from
observing the persistent differences in the way the US and European Union (EU) antitrust
authorities operate. In the US, federal and state courts decide on cases prosecuted by
national agencies (Federal Trade Commission in our example). In Europe, competition law
enforcement is most often an administrative process in which agencies, such as the European
Commission, also make decisions.
Chapter 3 of this thesis analyses the outcomes of strategic information disclosure under
different institutional arrangements: the adversarial and the inquisitorial. A decision-maker
Abstract 4
(DM) must take a binary decision faced with information provided by two persuaders: a firm
that has an intrinsic interest in the final decision, and an expert who reacts only to monetary
incentives designed by the DM. Under the adversarial arrangement, the expert is remunerated
if the final decision is unfavorable to the firm. Under the inquisitorial arrangement, the
remuneration is conditional only on the amount of disclosed information.
Common wisdom suggests that having two opposing parties competing to acquire infor-
mation leads to higher efforts, and presumably to a higher level of precision for the final
decision. At the same time, the possibility of remaining silent by withholding the unfavor-
able evidence, together with the associated higher costs of effort, undermines the superiority
of the adversarial system.
I characterize the equilibrium of this disclosure game under the two arrangements, and
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for one system to dominate the other with
respect to the level of precision of the final decision, net of the total cost of information
acquisition. I find additional arguments in favor of the inquisitorial system.
Chapter 1
Strategic Limitation of Price
Comparison by Competing Firms. An
Experimental Study

CHAPTER 1 1.1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This paper provides experimental evidence on the strategic limitation of price comparison
by competing firms. We develop a generalized theoretical framework that accommodates
both homogenous and vertically differentiated markets and show that firms adapt to the
competitiveness of the market by making price comparison costly for consumers. We find
supportive evidence for the theoretical prediction that firms make their pricing structures
hard to compare when charging high prices, and keep their prices easy to compare when
charging low prices. The presence of more players on the market pushes firms to choose
complex pricing structures more often, and as a result market prices increase.
In standard models of competition, consumers are assumed to be perfectly able to com-
pare two different price offers and choose the best one. This leads to a Bertrand equilibrium
outcome with prices equal to marginal costs, and the firm with the lowest price capturing
the whole market. Empirical studies have shown, however, that consumers do not always
fully compare the different price offers available, as there may be a cost to comparing the
prices that they will pay. Subsequently, they may not choose the best offer available.
The challenges consumers experience in comparing different price offers are attributed in
the literature to various psychological biases and to the fact that it is costly for consumers
to compare several offers as pricing strategies can be quite complex. This leads to consumers
having different information about various offers’ attributes. Examples of hardly comparable
offers can be seen in various sectors including credit offers in finance, mobile phone tariffs, the
airline industry and electricity contracts. Prices could be presented in different measurement
units, which are costly to convert into a single dimension. Offers could also include hidden
charges, which create a cost for the consumer to find the complete price that they will pay. In
addition, the mobile industry divides their tariffs into a large number of categories, making
it costly for the individual consumer to calculate the total price they face.
Several recent works (Gabaix, Laibson (2005), Spiegler (2004), Pissione and Spiegler
(2009), Carlin (2009)) show that firms respond to increased competition by employing more
complex pricing schedules, rather than with more competitive pricing. Carlin (2009) in
particular shows that high priced firms choose complex pricing structures, whereas low-
priced firms choose transparent pricing structures. More players in the market results in
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firms adopting complex pricing strategies more often.
The application of these theoretical models to policy design is, however, limited. Firstly
the models rely on strong assumptions about information acquisition and result in a very
complex equilibrium outcomes. Secondly it is difficult to empirically test these models, as
it is hard to separate different possible reasons for pricing differentials, for example product
differentiation or price discrimination may be misinterpreted as complex pricing strategies.
The main benefit of an experimental approach is that the laboratory setting allows us to
control for these other factors, and limit our focus to the strategic choice of firms to make the
comparison of their offers more difficult. The UK’s Office of Fair Trading launched a high
profile study in October 2009 in an attempt to understand what kind of pricing practices
are more likely to harm consumers and the relevant policies that can minimize this harm.
Kayalci (2010) finds experimental evidence that consumers tend to make more mistakes when
faced with complex price structures. We contribute to the existing experimental literature
by focusing our analysis solely on the behavior of firms, modeling consumers’ behavior in
accordance with the previous findings. This allows us to focus purely on the questions posed
above, without the distortions of the real world. Therefore in our experiment we concentrate
on the strategic behavior of firms and the resulting price distribution rather than on the
behavior of buyers. We treat complexity of the price structure as the effort required for
buyers to compare the price of a given firm with the prices of other firms in a market. We vary
the number of firms between the sessions and the upper level of complexity choice possible
within the sessions. We find supportive evidence for the theoretical prediction that the firms
that choose higher prices make their pricing structures hard to compare, whereas the firms
that choose lower prices make their prices transparent. Firms adopt to the competitiveness
of the market by making their offers more difficult to compare. More players on the market
makes firms choose complex pricing structures more often, and as a result the market prices
increase.
We also contribute to the theoretical literature by generalizing the price-complexity game
developed by Carlin (2009). He considers a set-up with homogeneous products, in which
only a portion of all consumers are informed about all prices and the other portion remains
uninformed. Firms affect these proportions by their individual choices of price complexity,
thus exerting an externality on the demand that other firms face. The effect of the complexity
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choice of one firm is independent of the complexity choices of other firms, i.e. the complexity
choices of firms affect the proportion of informed consumers in a additive way. At equilibrium,
price dispersion arises because firms compete strategically for a market share from both types
of consumers. High price complexity is chosen by the firms that charge high prices with a
fixed ex-ante probability that depends only on the number of firms.
We generalize the theoretical framework of Carlin by relaxing the additivity assumption
about the way complexity choices of firms affect the proportion of informed consumers. We
show that the qualitative results of Carlin (2009) still apply for a range of assumed functional
forms. We then provide new quantitative predictions as to the frequency with which firms
adopt complex or transparent pricing strategies. We further show how our framework can
be used to accommodate markets with vertically differentiated products and thus contribute
to the existing literature on obfuscation in vertically differentiated product markets. Alter-
natively, Armstrong and Chen (2008) study the market outcome in a setting with vertically
differentiated products when some consumers are inattentive to product qualities. The equi-
librium results in the provision of both low and high quality goods, even when the low quality
goods are not socially desirable. In equilibrium firms take advantage of the existence of the
inattentive consumers and ‘cheat’ from time to time by providing low-quality goods, which
allows them to earn positive profits. We show that in the equilibrium both high and low
quality firms can engage in obfuscation, depending on the shape of consumers’ preferences
and the cost functions of firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical set-up
and the resulting equilibrium in the case of homogeneous products. We then demonstrate
how our model can accommodate vertically differentiated products. In Section 3 we solve a
simplified version of the theoretical model using the assumptions of Carlin (2009) and derive
testable results on the effects of changes in market structure on equilibrium outcomes.
In Section 4 we introduce our experimental design, in which we test these predictions in
the laboratory environment where human subjects acting as firms sell a homogeneous good
to robot buyers. Section 5 analyses the results. Our preliminary experimental data supports
the theoretical predictions of the model. However we find systematic discrepancies between
the theoretical and observed price distributions. In all the treatments prices tend to be more
dispersed than the theory predicts. Also the average market complexity in the treatment
9
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with a lower upper bound on complexity choice is systematically lower that the predicted




Suppose there is a large number of consumers who each desire to purchase, at most, one unit
of a good. The maximum price any consumer will pay for the good- the consumer’s valuation
- is denoted by v. Consumers might be of two types: informed and uninformed. Firms can
influence the proportion of the different types of consumers through their strategic choices.
Firms
n firms have the same constant unit cost, normalized to zero. Each firm chooses the “level”
of its prices, pi ∈ [0, v], as well as the complexity of its price structure, ρi ∈ {ρ, ρ}.
The complexity of the price structure represents how difficult it is to evaluate and compare
a given price with competitors’ prices; it can reflect the number of itemized fees included
in the price structure, or the complexity of the frame being adopted — fees in small print,
add-on prices, etc. The choice of complexity is costless and is firm’s i private information.
This assumption states that adopting a certain frame does not convey information about
its individual complexity, but rather contributes to the overall market complexity in an
unobservable way. So adopting a frame different to your competitor makes its harder to
assess all the offers, but does not identify which frame is more complex.
The individual choices of complexity of price by firms determine the proportions of dif-
ferent types of consumers. That is, the proportion of shoppers, λ, the and the proportion
of uninformed consumers, (1− λ), are functions of the complexity index:
λ : [ρ, ρ]n → [0, 1]. (1.1)
10
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The proportion of informed buyers decreases with firm’s individual choice of price com-
plexity. This assumption reflects the idea that the harder it is to compare prices, the less
consumers will choose to compare prices. As a result the proportion of informed buyers
decreases while the proportion of uninformed consumers increases.
To summarize the effect of the firms’ individual complexity choice on the proportion of





< 0, for all i. (1.2)
Assumption one states that the proportion of the informed consumer decreases with
firm’s i individual price complexity. This assumption reflects the idea that the harder it is
to compare prices, the less likely the consumers will do so.
Timing
In period 1 each firm i simultaneously chooses its price level, pi, and the complexity of its
pricing schedule, ρi. Firms’ individual complexity choices determine the resulting proportion
of uninformed consumers and informed buyers. In period 2 the proportions of different types
of consumers are determined and consumers make their purchase decisions. Uninformed
consumers do not observe any information, therefore they choose a firm to buy from based
on their rational expectations. informed buyers choose the product with the lowest price.
Equilibrium
Define J∗ to be the set of firms who quote the lowest price in equilibrium. Let nj be
the number of firms in J∗, so that the nj firms in J
∗ split the demand from the informed
consumers equally.
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where the first term is the expected profit from informed buyers: firm i gets all informed
buyers, λ, if it charges the lowest price out of n firms. In the case when more than one firm
has the lowest price, each firm gets equal share of informed buyers.
The second term is the uninformed consumers. Firms equally share the demand from
uninformed consumers.
Carlin (2009) shows that there is no pure strategy price equilibrium of this game. We
thus concentrated on the mixed strategy equilibrium of this game, in which firms choose their
prices according to equilibrium cdf F (p). Before formally stating the result, we introduce
more notations:
Let l be the number of firms out of n, that choose transparent price. Define λ(l, n), to
be the proportion of informed consumers when l firms out of n choose ρ. Further denote by
bλ(l) the proportion of informed consumers for a given n. So λ(0) is therefore the proportion
of informed consumers when all the firms choose complex prices, ρ. We further denote by
(1− Λ) and (1− Λ) the expected proportion of uninformed consumers when firm i chooses
ρ and ρ respectively.
A symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium)There exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibria, in
which firms choose their prices according to equilibrium price distribution F ∗(p) with the
support [pL, v] and there exists unique bp, bF such that:





ρ p < bp
ρ p > bp
ρ ∈ {ρ, ρ} p = bp.
ii) Firms choose ρ with a unique probability, bF , that is implicitly given by:





such that F ∗(bp) = bF .
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Proof. The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
Thus for a given bλ(·), the firm’s choice of price complexity is determined solely by the equi-
librium price distribution and by the number of firms. Firms choose ρ so that to maximize
the proportion of informed consumers (minimize the proportion of uninformed consumers)
for the low range of prices, or to minimize it (maximize it) for the high range of prices.
The choice to maximize the proportion of certain type of consumer depends on the expected
profitability of attracting this type of consumer. On the one hand, when a firm charges low
price, the probability of attracting all informed consumers is relatively high and this gives
the firm incentives to maximize the share of informed consumers by choosing a transparent
pricing structure and thus decreasing price complexity.
On the other hand, when a firm charges high price, the probability of attracting informed
consumers becomes small and a firm’s demand is coming mainly from the uninformed con-
sumers. Hence, the firm would minimize the amount of the informed consumers by making
its price complex in order to discourage price comparison and maximize the proportion of
uninformed consumers.
Note that Λ− Λ can be rewritten as (1− Λ− (1− Λ)), the difference in the proportion
of uninformed consumers when firm i decreases its price complexity from ρ to ρ. Firm i
is indifferent between choosing transparent or complex price when the expected change in
the demand from informed consumers is equal to the corresponding change in the expected
demand from uninformed consumers.
Our model accommodates the result of Carlin (2009) as a particular case. Precisely, if
the change in λ with respect to price complexity is independent of complexity choices of the
other firms, i.e. bλ(1) − bλ(0) = bλ(2) − bλ(1) = bλ(n) − bλ(n − 1). In this case and due to the
property of the binomial distribution, Λ− Λ = bλ(1)− bλ(0). Thus, condition (1.4) becomes:
[1− bF ]n−1 = 1
n
, (1.5)
and firms choose complex prices with the ex-ante probability 1
n
1
n−1 . Thus, the firms choice
of price and product complexity is determined solely by the equilibrium price distribution
and by the number of firms as in Carlin (2009). However, for a broader class of λ function,
13
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the probability of choosing different complexity levels, can be both smaller and greater than
1
n
, which we demonstrate later in numerical example for duopoly setting.
Duopoly example: Consider the case of two firms. Let us introduce the possible real-
ization of λ in this case. There are three possible outcomes for the proportion of informed
consumers:
bλ(2) ≡ λ(2, 2)
bλ(1) ≡ λ(1, 2)
bλ(0) ≡ λ(0, 2).
For p < bp, the expected profit of firm i is given by:
Π(p, ρ, |σ−i) = p

[1− bF ]bλ(1) + [ bF − F (p)]bλ(2) + 1
2
(1− bFbλ(2)− [1− bF ]bλ(1))

.
For p > bp, the expected profit of firm i is given by:
Π(p, ρ, |σ−i) = p

[1− bF ]bλ(0) + 1
2
(1− bFbλ(1)− [1− bF ]bλ(0))









] for p < bp
1− [ (y−p)(2�λ(0)�λ(1)+�λ(2)−(�λ(1))2−�λ(0)−�λ(0)�λ(2)2)
2p(�λ(0)�λ(2)−�λ(0)2)









In the case when λ is additive in complexity levels, Carlin (2009) predicts that for n = 2,
bF is equal to one half. This result can be obtained as a particular case of our model, when
bλ(2) − bλ(1) = �λ(2)−�λ(0)
2
. However if bλ(2) − bλ(1) > �λ(2)−�λ(0)
2
, bF is greater than one half and
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vice versa.
Entry effect
Given that the frequency with which firms choose complex prices depends on the number
of firms, the important question is thus to investigate how the incentives of firms to choose
complex prices change with the number of players in the market. Note that the number of
firms affect both the probabilities of attracting different types of consumers and the marginal
effect that ρ has on the proportion of informed consumers. Therefore the net effect of change
in the number of firms depends on the interplay between these properties. In the following
proposition we characterize a sufficient condition that leads to a decreases in bF as n increases.
Proposition 2 :ENTRY EFFECT: If λ(l, n) is logsupermodularity in differences:
λ(l, n)− λ(l − 1, n)
λ(1, n)− λ(0, n) −
λ(l, n′)− λ(l − 1, n′)
λ(1, n′)− λ(0, n′) ≥ 0 (1.6)
for l > 1 and n > n′, (1.7)
then when the number of firms increases, the frequency with which firms choose complex
prices and transparent matching values increases.
Proof. See Appendix B for a formal proof.
The property logsupermodularity in differences characterizes the curvature of λ function
. For example if λ is convex in l, then (1.6) implies that λ(l, n′) is more curved than λ(l, n).
This condition implies that when the number of competitors increases, the expected de-
mand from informed consumers decreases faster than the expected demand from uninformed
consumers. Therefore, firms put more weight on the strategy that limits price comparison. If
the number of firms is sufficiently large then all the firms choose complex prices and market
price complexity increases as a result.
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Numerical example:











Figure 1: Effect of Number of Firms
The graph above plots the equilibrium price distribution for n = 2 with λ(0, 2) = 0.1,
λ(1, 2) = 0.05,λ(2, 2) = 1 and n = 3 with λ(0, 3) = 0.05, λ(1, 3) = 0.2, λ(2, 3) = 0.6 and
λ(3, 3) = 1. For n = 3 the frequency of choosing transparent prices/complex matching values
( bF ) decreases with respect to n = 2. The equilibrium price distribution shifts downwards
in comparison to n = 2 and therefore prices increase with the number of firms. Thus this
numerical example demonstrates that increasing the number of firms in this setting leads to
higher and more complex prices and more transparent product characteristics.
Note that when λ is additive in the complexity choices of the firms, the property (1.6)
is satisfied with the equality sign and the only affect that matter is the change in the
probabilities of attracting different types of consumers. In this particular case Carlin (2009)
shows that the probability that a firm chooses high complexity (ρ) is monotonically increasing
in n. In the limit as n approaches infinity, all firms choose ρ. The expected industry
complexity is increasing in n.
As the number of firms increases firms choose complex prices more often. This result
is quite intuitive as when the number of competitors increases, the probability of winning
all the informed consumers decreases faster than the sure share of uninformed consumers.
Firms therefore choose to put more weight on the strategy that ensures positive profits, i.e.
they choose complex prices more often. As a result the overall market complexity increases,
and therefore the equilibrium proportion of uninformed consumers increases as well.
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The additivity assumption, makes permits to extend the above analysis to the setting
when the complexity is chosen from the continuous interval. This setting is particularly
amendable for the policy analysis, as the relevant policies to restore market transparency
would be to introduce a cap on how complex the firms can go in their choices of pricing
structures. We thus assume the ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ] and adopt the additivity assumption, i.e. d2λ
dρidρj
= 0
for all i 6= j. The effect of introducing the cap on complexity level on the equilibrium price
distribution is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The distribution of prices F (p) with the lower upper bound of complexity ρ
first order stochastically dominates that with a higher upper bound.
Proof. The regulation of complexity affects the equilibrium price distribution in two
ways: through the direct effect on λ and through the indirect effect on the frequency of
choosing complex prices, which in turn depends on λ. The effect on λ is straight forward: a
cap on price complexity increases λ, while a floor on price complexity reduces λ. The effect
on F (bp) is less obvious. Note that bF in case of linear λ is determined only by the number
of firms and hence is unaffected by complexity regulation. Therefore the price distribution
changes in the same direction as λ, thus increasing (lower prices) as a result of a price
complexity cap and decreasing (higher prices) as a result of a price complexity floor.
Introducing a complexity cap in this setting decreases the equilibrium prices, and thus
increases consumer welfare.
Vertical differentiation
In this section we show that our results apply as well to the vertically differentiated market.
Complexity in this case is interpreted as a tool that makes it more difficult to assess the net
value of the product. For example, complexity can be viewed as a detailed and comprehen-
sible disclosure of quality information, no-disclosure would correspond to a high complexity,
whereas complete disclosure corresponds to a transparent offer.
Consider n firms competing in compete in price, p, and quality, q. The firms face marginal
cost w(q) per unit of good of quality q, so that ∂w/∂q > 0 and have no capacity constraints.
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In the market, there is a continuum of consumers of unit mass who each have a unit
demand. The preferences of consumers over pair (p, q) are represented by utility function
U(p, q), which is strictly decreasing in p, strictly increasing in q, and continuous in (p, q).
Dubovik (2008) provides the necessary conditions that guarantee that for a given λ, there
exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where firms randomize in margins, i.e. in the levels of
utilities offered to consumers. In the equilibrium, higher margins, m, translate into lower
consumer’s utility. Appendix C provides in detail the assumptions.
This result implies that our above analysis applies directly to the vertically differentiated
markets once prices are replaced by margins. Therefore proposition 1 reads as: for m > bm,
firms choose high complexity of their offer and for m < bm, firms choose transparent offers.
The equilibrium is characterized by both quality and price dispersion, with the exception of
when preferences are quasi-linear in quality, i.e. U(p, q) = h(q) − p. In this case a unique
quality and dispersed prices are chosen by all firms in the equilibrium, and there is a price
dispersion in the equilibrium. Therefore the setting with homogeneous products can be
viewed as a particular case of the setting with vertically differentiated products, i.e. the
firms that choose higher prices choose high price complexity and vice versa.
Depending on the shape of consumer preferences and the firms’ cost functions, the equi-
librium dispersion of margins translates into the equilibrium dispersion of price and quality
pairs in the following way:
Case 1 In equilibrium utility is strictly decreasing in p. This case is consistent with
equilibrium level of quality being increasing or decreasing with the choice of price. so that
informed consumers will buy the cheapest product. Decreasing utility is consistent with
both increasing and decreasing g(p):
a) the quality offered in the equilibrium is increasing in p.
In this case informed consumers choose the firm that offers the lowest price and the lowest
quality as the marginal value of quality is low. Uninformed consumers get higher prices and
higher qualities. Firms that offer higher quality and higher prices choose high complexity.
b) the quality offered in equilibrium is decreasing in p.
In this case in the equilibrium informed consumer still buy the cheapest good but now
this good is of the highest quality. Uninformed consumers pay higher prices for a lower
18
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quality compared to informed consumers. Under this assumption firms that offer higher
prices and lower quality choose high complexity.
Case 2: Utility is strictly increasing in p.
In this case the informed consumers buy the most expensive good, as the marginal value
of quality is high. Uninformed consumers on average buy goods of lower price and lower
quality. Firms that offer low price and quality choose high complexity.
Note that in the The two cases described above show that at equilibrium several situation
can emerge. When the preferences of consumers are such that they prefer lower price and
lower quality, than it is the firms that produce high quality good that engage in obfuscation
practices. On the other hand when consumers’ preferences are such that fully informed
consumers will purchase high quality good, it is low quality firms that choose engage in
obfuscation. Therefore the quality level chosen by the firm is the poor indicator as to
whether the firm engages in the obfuscation practice. Therefore policies that intend to
regulate quality can backfire for the consumers in this case.
In the following section we test experimentally the incentive of firms to limit the compar-
ison of their offers in the setting with homogenous goods, which in turn can be interpreted
as the setting with vertically differentiated goods and quasi-linear preferences of consumer.
1.3 Experiment
1.3.1 Theoretical predictions and testable hypothesis
The model presented above provides theoretical predictions on the effects of changes in
different market parameters. such as the number of firms and an upper bound on the
complexity level. We test these predictions by varying the number of firms and the upper
bound of price complexity. The additivity assumption is particularly amendable for the
experimental setting as it allows us to explicitly solve the model for n = 2 and n = 4 and
thus obtain the quantitative predictions.
For experimental purposes we adopt a particular specification for the proportion of in-
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The parametrization for complexity level is chosen for reasons of convenience, in order
to maintain an integer number of resulting informed and uninformed buyers, and to obtain
sufficient changes in prices. We further vary the number of firms from 2 to 4 and the upper
bound of price complexity from 3 to 5.
We calculate he quantitative theoretical predictions for expected price, expected mini-
mum price and expected complexity for our experimental parameters. Table 1 summarizes
these predictions.
Table 1. Theoretical Predictions for Alternative Parameter Values
v = 100
ρ = 0
Epmin(informed) Ep(uninformed) EK(exp complexity)
ρ = 3 ρ = 5 ρ = 3 ρ = 5 ρ = 3 ρ = 5
n = 2 40 70 54 82 1.5 2.5
n = 4 31 57 64 84 1.9 3.16
We take the treatment with n = 2 and ρ = 3 as the benchmark treatment.
As Table 1 shows, compared to the benchmark treatment doubling the number of sellers
increases the average price paid by uninformed buyers by almost 19% and decreases the price
paid by informed buyers by 23%. The average market complexity increases as a result by
27%. Increasing ρ from 3 to 5 increases the price paid by uniformed buyers by 52% and the
price paid by informed buyers by 75%. The average market complexity increases as a result
by 67%.
We compare our laboratory market outcomes to the quantitative predictions shown in this
table, but based on previous experimental practices we do not expect such strong quantitative
equilibrium predictions to hold very precisely. Our empirical analysis will therefore focus on
the weaker, comparative static predictions summarized by the following hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 1. Complexity choice is positively correlated with price.
The average market complexity is an externality in this model. By choosing individ-
ual complexity each firm affects the number of informed and uninformed buyers. So firms
choosing lower prices would naturally want to increase the number of informed buyers by
choosing a low level of complexity, thereby lowering the average market complexity. Firms
that choose higher prices have opposite incentives.
The important prediction of the equilibrium described in the Proposition 1 is that the
firms charging a price above a certain threshold bp choose the highest complexity level. If the
price is below this threshold, the firms choose the lowest level of complexity.
Instead we adopt a weaker hypothesis, that the firms that charge higher prices choose
higher levels of complexity and the ones charging lower prices choose lower levels of com-
plexity.
Hypothesis 2. An increase in the upper bound of the available complexity level results in
both higher average and minimum expected market prices.
Increasing the upper bound on complexity allows firms to increase average market com-
plexity and the resulting share of uninformed buyers for any given price. Therefore, as
demand from uninformed buyers increases it is profitable for firms to increase the frequency
of choosing high prices. This would result in a higher expected price as well as a higher
expected minimum price compared to the benchmark treatment.
Hypothesis 3. An increase in the number of firms results in higher average market
complexity. Firms choose higher complexity more often when the number of competitors
is higher.
As the number of firms increases the probability that a given firm has the lowest price, and
therefore the informed share of the market demand, decreases. Therefore, for a given price
distribution, the range for which it is profitable for a firm to choose higher complexity would
increase. This results in a higher probability of a firm choosing high levels of complexity,
and hence a higher average market complexity.
Hypothesis 4. An increase in the number of firms results in a higher average price and a
lower minimum price in the market.
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Increasing the number of firms has two opposing effects: from one side competition for
the informed buyers becomes more aggressive which results in a firm choosing a lower price
when they choose low complexity. This in turn decreases the expected minimum price. From
the other side increased competition for informed buyers makes firms choose higher prices
more frequently and therefore maintain their guaranteed profits from the uninformed buyers.
This results in a higher average price compared to the benchmark treatment with just two
sellers.
1.3.2 Experimental design and procedures
The experiment modifies the standard posted-offer environment by introducing complexity
levels and the number of firms as treatment variables. In this experiment we do not aim
to test the behavior of buyers, but rather to concentrate on firms’ strategic behavior. The
subjects are the firms selling a homogeneous good to robot buyers. A computerized interface
using the software z-Tree is used to conduct the experiment (Fischbacher, 1999).
The experiment consists of 8 sessions and was conducted at the Toulouse School of
Economics in spring and autumn 2011. 12 graduate students participated in each session.
To disentangle the effects of changing the number of firms and the upper bound of com-
plexity, we vary the number of firms across the sessions and the upper bound of complexity
within the sessions. Six sessions constitute a Two-seller treatment and the other six will
constitute a Four-Seller treatment. In each session subjects play a market game for real
money rewards. Each session consists of three phases of 20 periods each (total 60 periods).
In three sessions out of six, referred to as "Low-High-Low," the available upper bound of
complexity (ρ) is low in the phase 1 (periods 1-20), ρ is high in the phase 2 (periods 21-40)
and ρ is low in the phase 3 (periods 41-60) again. In the remaining three sessions the order
is reversed "High-Low-High". Table 2 summarizes the experimental design.
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Table 2 Experimental design
Upper bound of complexity ρ
High-Low-High Low-High-Low
n = 2 2 sessions of 12 subjects 2 sessions of 12 subjects
n = 4 2 sessions of 12 subjects 2 sessions of 12 subjects
Robot buyers. Each market consists of 20 robot buyers who buy 4 units each. The
computerized buyers are programmed to buy all 4 units from the cheapest firm if they are
informed and split the units equally between all the firms if they are uninformed (each firm
therefore gets 1 or 2 units of demand depending on the treatment). The amount of informed
and uninformed buyers is determined by the resulting average market complexity. The higher
the average complexity the higher the number of uninformed robots. This relationship
is assumed to capture the fact that the more complex the market structure is the more
difficult it is for buyers to calculate the actual price and more buyers optimally choose
to remain uninformed. Several experimental studies provide evidence that human buyers
make more mistakes when faced with complex prices (or products) and that the amount of
mistakes increases with average complexity (Kayalci (2010), Sitzia (2008)), which justifies
our modeling of the behavior of robot-buyers.
The use of computerized robot-buyers is motivated by several concerns. Firstly, the use
of robot buyers allows us to abstract from the behavior of buyers and to concentrate on
the behavior of firms. Secondly, employing human buyers may cause psychological factors
that are common in laboratory environment but are not relevant in real markets to influence
the market outcome. For example a high repetition of simple computational exercises can
lead to a significant learning effect for human buyers. Also factors such as an endowment
effect, lack of motivation to perform repeated calculations, or differences in cognitive abilities
can appear in the laboratory and may not necessarily be relevant in the real markets. For
example, in Abrams et al, (2000) human buyers were rejecting profitable transactions when
faced with high prices, even when it was efficient to purchase.
Firms. At the beginning of each period subjects are randomly assigned to groups that
form a market with two or four sellers depending on the session. In order to exclude the pos-
sibility of collusion, subjects do not know who is in their group and are randomly rematched
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every period.
The complexity concept is introduced as an effort level that buyers have to exert in
order to observe and compare prices. In each period sellers have to choose prices and the
level of effort. The procedure is carefully explained to the subjects in instructions before
the experiment starts. Instructions are available in Appendix D. The subjects are informed
about the externality effect of their effort choice on other firms. The trade off between
effort choice and the number of informed and uninformed buyers is also carefully explained.
The proportion of uninformed buyers is proportional to average effort, so that the share of
uninformed buyers is equal to the average resulting market complexity divided by 5. The
motivation for the chosen parameters and functional forms is to maintain convenient integer
numbers.
In each period subjects choose a price from the set {0, 1, 2, ..., 100} and a level of effort,
which corresponds to the complexity level. In "Low-High-Low," in phase 1 (periods 1-20)
sellers choose the effort from the set {0, 1, 2, 3} , in phase 2 (periods 21-40) from the set
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and in phase 3 (periods 41-60) from the set {0, 1, 2, 3} again. In "High-
Low-High" in phase 1 (periods 1-20) sellers choose effort from the set{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , in
phase 2 (periods 21-40) from the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and in phase 3 (periods 41-60) from the set
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} .again.
Example: Consider phase 2 of the Four-seller treatment: if all the firms choose effort
level 4 the amount of uninformed buyers would be 16 out of 20, or if seller 1 and 2 choose a
level of effort equal to 0, seller 3 chooses level of effort 2, seller 4 chooses level of effort 4 the
number of uninformed buyers would be 6 out of 20.
When all the subjects submit their price offers and effort levels, profits for each seller
will be determined in experimental points, that are calculated as price times quantity sold.
At the end of each period a ’Result Screen’ is displayed on each computer with information
on all the prices and levels of effort chosen by other sellers in the market, and quantities
sold to informed and uninformed buyers in this period. Also each seller receives feedback on
his individual performance: sales to informed buyers, sales to uninformed buyers, own point
earnings in this period, as well as accumulated points over periods.
We adopt the argument of Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2001) in choosing the nature of
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feedback provided. In their paper they follow Cason and Friedman (2000), where at the end
of each period a seller receives information about the entire price distribution. This set-up
resulted in strong support for theoretical mixed strategies predictions. We believe that such
a design helps subjects to develop an intuition regarding the best strategies, rather than
expecting the subjects to correctly predict the equilibrium strategies, given the complexity
of the equilibrium outcome.
At the end of a session each subject is paid a participation fee plus the accumulated
points from all the 60 periods converted to euros at the certain rate.
1.4 Results
8 sessions of the experiment were conducted in the experimental laboratory of Toulouse
School of Economics. Four sessions (Session 1, 2, 5, 6) employed a Two-seller treatment and
the other four sessions (Session 3, 4, 7, 8) employed a Four- seller treatment. In Session 1,
2, 3 and 4, ρ varied in the order 5 − 3 − 5. In sessions 5, 6, 7 and 8, ρ varied in the order
3− 5− 3. Otherwise the procedures were the same for each session.
96 graduate students were recruited via E-mail announcement about the remunerated
experiment where their earnings depend on their and other participants’ decisions. 12 sub-
jects participated in each session. Subjects accumulated earnings over the 60 periods. The
average earnings are 12.75 euros in Two - seller treatments and 6 euros in Four-seller treat-
ments for the session lasting between 50 and 70 minutes. At the end of each session, subjects
completed a short post-experimental questionnaire and the question “Would you be willing
to take part in other experiments of this kind?” received 100 percent affirmative responses.
We consider phase 1 and 6 first periods of phase 2 and 3 as a learning period and base
our analysis on the data from 14 last periods of phase 2 and 3 of each session. The results
are summarized below.
Result 1: Firms that choose higher prices, choose higher complexity.
We estimate a relationship between the choice of complexity level and the price level
using random effect GLS model.
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In order to get an unbiased estimator of this effect we need to solve the possible en-
dogeniety issue between the choice of complexity and the choice of price. We generate an
instrumental variable for price to control for possible endogeniety issue. We construct the
IV variable for each individual in the following way: we take the level of complexity chosen
by a given individual and then compute an average of prices within other individuals with
the same choice of the level of complexity. This produces and IV variable that is correlated
with the complexity choice but uncorrelated with the error term.
The graph below represents a scatter plot of complexity and price by the number of firms
(0 if n = 2 and 1 if n = 4) and by the upper bound of complexity level (1 if ρ = 3 and 0 if
ρ = 5), so that {0, 1} represents a treatment with n = 2 and ρ = 3 and {1, 0} represents a






40 60 80 100 40 60 80 100
0, 0 0, 1







Graphs by n4 and phase2
The graph illustrates as well that when n = 4 high complexity is chosen more often and
for a larger price range that when n = 2.
The table below presents regression results for the "low" treatment (ρ = 3) and n = 4.
The choice of price level has a positive significant effect on the choice of the complexity level.
The effect is significant at five percent significance level.
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The regressions for different treatments produce similar results and for this reason we
omit their presentation
Result 2. The average complexity level is higher in the Four-seller treatment compared
with the Two-seller treatment.
Theory predicts that the average market complexity increases with the number of firms.
In the table below we can see that the average complexity level is systematically higher in
the sessions employing 4 sellers than in the sessions employing 2 sellers as well as in the
phases with the higher upper bound of complexity level (ρ = 5).
Average Complexity
ρ n = 2 n = 4
Sessions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Experimental 5 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.5 2 .4 3 .1 3.2 3.2
3 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.7 1 .8 1 .8 1 .9
Theoretical 5 2.5 3.2
3 1.5 1.9
Table 4
In fact for both treatments "high" and "low" the null hypothesis of no competitive static
effect can be rejected at 1 percent significance level applyingWilcoxon rank - sum test. The
p-value of 0.001 indicates the probability under the null hypothesis of obtaining a sum of
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ranks of at least as large as that observed (with a rank of 1 assigned to the session yielding
the lowest outcome and the sum is based on the ranks of the four-session treatment)
Figure 2 below displays five-period moving averages for the average complexity levels
chosen by the subjects. The complexity levels tend to be higher in the Four - seller treatment
compared to the Two - seller treatment. Therefore in the Four- seller treatment the average
proportion of the uninformed buyers tend to be higher than in the treatment with just two
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Figure 2
Note that in the treatment with n = 2 the average complexity is systematically lower
than a predicted value, while in the treatment with n = 4 the average complexity fluctuates
around the predicted value.
According to Proposition 1 firms would choose either high or low (corner values) com-
plexity levels. The frequency of choosing high complexity is predicted to be higher for n = 4
than for n = 2. Figure 3 presents a histogram of complexity choices for n = 2 and n = 4.
We clearly observe the tendency to choose corner values of complexity interval as well as the
supporting evidence for the fact that higher complexity levels are chosen more frequently in
n = 4 treatment.
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Result 3 Average prices paid by uninformed consumers increase with number of firms and
increase with the upper level of complexity.
The theory predicts that the average price paid by uninformed buyers increases with the
number of firms and with the upper level of complexity. The results of the eight sessions are
summarized in the table below:
Average Price
ρ n = 2 n = 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Experimental 5 71 72 78 79 73 79 80 80
3 45 54 60 65 68 69 70 71
Theoretical 5 82 84
3 54 64
Table 5
The average price is systematically higher in the sessions employing 4 sellers than in the
sessions employing 2 seller treatment as well as in the phases with upper complexity level is
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5 than in the phases with upper complexity level being 3. This difference is significant by
Wilcoxon rank - sum test at 1 percent significance level.
Figure 4 displays five-period moving averages of average prices in the Two- and Four-
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Figure 4
Comparing the values of average prices across the two phases, we can observe a clear
shifts in the predicted directions. The average prices tend to be higher when the upper
level of complexity is high. So uninformed consumers are better off when the upper level of
complexity is lower. Note that in the treatment with ρ = 5, the prices are systematically
lower than the predicted values. Risk-aversion of the players could be a candidate explanation
for this result, however this result does not hold for ρ = 3 treatment.
We will come back later to the discussion of the effect of risk aversion on experimental
result, when we analyze cumulative price distributions.
As to the effect of number of firms, average prices tend to be higher in a treatment with
four seller compared to a treatment with two sellers. So in this case uninformed consumers
are worse-off.
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Result 5. Average minimum price paid by informed buyers decreases with the number of
firms and increases with the upper level of complexity.
Minimum Price
ρ n = 2 n = 4
Sessions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Experimental 5 60 60 67 67 30 48 51 51
3 32 40 46 51 26 28 33 33
Theoretical 5 70 57
3 40 31
Table 6
Experimental data clearly supports the theoretical prediction and again this result is
significant by Wilcoxon rank - sum test at 1 percent significance level.
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Figure 1.1: Figure 6
We can observe a clear shift in predicted by theory direction. So minimum prices are
higher in the phases with high upper bound of the complexity level and lower in the treatment
with 4 sellers compared to treatment with 2 sellers. We again observe the phenomenon of
prices being systematically lower than predicted values in the treatment with higher upper
bound of the complexity level.
Informed consumers are better off when the upper complexity level is lower and the
competition is more intense in the sense of increased number of firms.
Our results presented so far clear provide support for the theoretical predictions.
However we observe some discrepancies between theoretical and empirical price distrib-
utions in each treatment. Figures 6-9 display the theoretical and empirical cumulative price
distributions for all the treatments.
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Figure 9
We can see that in "high" treatment the prices are systematically lower than theoretically
predicted. However looking at the "low" treatment, we observe that theoretical and empir-
ical price distributions cross , with prices being lower than theoretical predictions in a low
range and higher in a high range. Morgan, Ozen and Sefton in their experimental study
with exogenous proportion of uninformed consumers record similar disrepancies. However
these disrepancies take place within different number of firms rather then within different
proportions of uninformed consumers. One of the candidate explanations for observed gap
between theoretical and empirical results is risk aversion of the subjects in the experiment.
The theoretical results are derived for risk-neutral consumers, while in the reality the sub-
jects are risk-averse. Morgan, Ozen and Sefton disregard such explanation, motivating this
by the fact that if risk-aversion matters, than in the Four-seller treatment prices should be
even higher than the theoretical predictions, which is not consistent with the observed result.
This logic is indeed valid if firms cannot effect the proportion of informed and uninformed
consumers.
In our setting, adding risk -aversion, might result in the following departure from the
theoretical results derived under risk-neutrality: risk averse firms choose lower prices in the
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range where they choose low price complexity and they choose higher prices in the range
where they choose high price complexity than risk neutral firms. We do not formally derive
this result for the moment, but just provide an intuition. Once firms choose high complexity
they are exposed to higher risk of loosing the uninformed consumers and therefore they do
it only if return is sufficiently higher than under risk-neutrality, therefore they charge higher
prices. However when firms choose low complexity they are ready to accept lower pay-off but
to decrease the risk they face, therefore they charge lower prices, which results in higher and
more sure probability to attract the informed consumers. In "high" treatment the threshold
to choose high complexity is the maximum available price. That is why we might not observe
the crossing phenomenon in this treatment.
1.5 Conclusions
Our experimental study contributes to the existing empirical literature on price dispersion
providing additional evidence that in the presence of consumers that do not readily observe
all the prices, the law of one price does not hold. Moreover, we find evidence that once having
a possibility to ensure the presence of uninformed consumers, firms take an advantage of this
opportunity and secure a positive proportion of uninformed consumers. Our experimental
results confirm the theoretical predictions that increasing the number of firms results in more
complex prices, higher proportion of uninformed consumers/ Moreover the average price that
uninformed consumers pay increases with the number of firms, while the price that informed
consumers pay decreases. The overall welfare is thus increases as a result. Though the
experimental data is largely in line with all the theoretical predictions, we still observe as in
previous experimental studies the disrepanacies between theoretical and empirical cumulative
distributions. However the argument of risk-aversion gains more support in our setting,
though it stays only a tentative explanation for the moment. A further development for our
work would be to introduce product heterogeneity into the theoretical model both vertical
and horizontal ad to study the incentives of firms to introduce noise on the price dimension
or on the product dimension, and therefore to affect either price or product comparison by
consumers.
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1.6 Appendix
A: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness
Complexity choice
First let us consider profit at p = v. At this price firm i will not get any price shoppers and
thus maximizes the proportion of uninformed consumers, by choosing ρ. Let pL be the lowest
price of the equilibrium support. At p = pL firm i gets all the price shoppers and shares
the expected demand from uninformed consumers with other firms. Therefore it wants to
maximize the proportion of informed consumers by choosing ρ.
p
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bF < 1.Therefore as bF increases the RHS crosses 1 from below, at a unique value if bF .
Price distribution
If all the competitors charge prices so that F (p) ≤ bF , then in equilibrium they also choose
complexity pair (ρ), thus the expected fraction of price shoppers is bλ(0). In equilibrium, the
profits earned at each price charged (price such that F (p) ≤ bF ) should be equal. Therefore
F ∗(p) on ( bF , 1] should satisfy:
pi{[1− F (p)]n−1bλ(0) +
1
n
(1− Λ)} = y(1− Λ) 1
n
(1.10)
solving for symmetric equilibrium, F ∗(p) is given by:
F ∗(p) = 1− [y[(1− Λ)
1
n







Note that F ∗(p) is uniquely defined on the interval ( bF , 1]
Consider now prices such thatF (p) > bF . At this prices the level of complexity that
maximize the expected profit isρ = ρ.
Let Φ(p) be the expected demand from price shoppers when firm i chooses transparent
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At any p the expected profit of firm i should be the same as when charging price bp such




(1− Λ)} = bp{[1− F (bp)]n−1bλ(1) + 1
n
(1− Λ)} (1.12)
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The unique pL is given by:
pL =






Uniqueness of F ∗(p)
We showed above that F ∗(p) is uniquely determined on [bp, v]. Note that pL is uniquely
determined. Therefore to show that F (p) is unique, it is sufficient to show that it is unique
for any p of the support [pL, v]. However on the interval [pL, bp), the uniqueness requires
further examination. Consider (1.12), the right hand side (RHS) of this equation is given
by bp{[1 − bF ]n−1bλ(1) + 1
n
(1 − Λ)}, which is a singleton and does not vary with p. The left








[1− bF ]n−l[ bF − F ]l−1bλ(l) + 1
n
(1− Λ)}. (1.13)
In order to proof the uniqueness of F (p), it is sufficient to show that there is a unique F
that satisfies (1.12). Note that (1.13) is strictly decreasing with F and strictly increasing in
p. Let F = 0, then at p = pL LHS is equal to RHS, while at p > pL, LHS is greater than
the RHS for any p on [pL,bp). At the same time at F = bF , the LHS is strictly smaller than
RHS at p < bp. Given that (1.13) is strictly decreasing with F, there exists a unique F , that
satisfies (1.12).
B: Increase in n.











)l−1(λ(l, n)− λ(l − 1, n))
λ(1, n)− λ(0, n) . (1.14)
We impose the following assumptions:
1. If all firms choose transparent prices and complex product features or equivalently all
forms choose complex prices, the fraction of informed consumers is the same for any number
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of competitors on the market, i.e. λ(0, n) = λ(0, n′) and λ(n, n) = λ(n′, n′), ∀ n, n′.
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λ(3, 3)− λ(2, 3)
λ(1, 3)− λ(0, 3) .
Therefore it must be the case that:
bF2
[1− bF2]
λ(2, 2)− λ(1, 2)
λ(1, 2)− λ(0, 2) =
bF3
[1− bF3]
λ(2, 3)− λ(1, 3)
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Note that if
λ(2, 2)− λ(1, 2)
λ(1, 2)− λ(0, 2) <
λ(2, 3)− λ(1, 3)







λ(3, 3)− λ(2, 3)
λ(1, 3)− λ(0, 3) ,
then bF2 must be larger than bF3.
















Consider now n = 4.
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bF3 is larger than bF4, if
λ(2, 4)− λ(1, 4)
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λ(4, 4)− λ(3, 4)
λ(1, 4)− λ(0, 4)(1.15)
λ(2, 3)− λ(1, 3)







λ(3, 3)− λ(2, 3)









then the condition (1.15) is
satisfied.
The same logic can be applied for n larger than four.
C: Vertical differentiation
We outline the assumptions necessary to establish the existence of the equilibrium. For
formal proofs refer to Dubovik (2008).
Assumption 1: The utility function is strictly decreasing in p, strictly increasing in q,
and continuous in (p, q).
The outside option is given by U(pr, qr). Consumers will purchase a good i if
U(pi, qi) ≥ max [U(pr, qr), U(pj, qj)] .
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s.t.U(p, q) ≥ u,
for every u, where u is a certain level of utility. Consumers and firms have opposing
interests with respect to pair (p, q), so it is reasonable to assume that this problem
has a solution. For technical reasons Dubovik (2008) introduces a slightly stronger
assumption to guarantee the uniqueness of the solution:
Assumption 2: Problem (1.17) has a unique solution ( q∗(u), p∗(u)) for every u. There
exists a continuous function g(p) such that q∗(u) = g(p∗(u)) for given u.
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 allow to claim that the pairs (p∗, q∗) that would be
offered in equilibrium lie on the contract curve, as choosing (p∗, g(p∗)) strictly dominates all
other choices. Also these assumptions imply that utility over a contract curve, U(p, g(p)), is
strictly monotone in p.
Now let the equilibrium margin, m, be expressed as:
m(p) = p− w(g(p)).
Dubovik (2008) shows that the following is true (Lemma 1):
U(pi, g(pi)) > U(pj, g(pj))⇐⇒ m(pi) < m(pj).
Therefore, choosing p and q translates for the firms into choosing m(p).
The equilibrium is characterized by a price and a quality dispersion.1 Firms make positive
profits. In equilibrium only the lowest or the highest level of complexity is chosen. The firms
that charge higher margins choose high complexity and the firms that choose low margins
choose low complexity.
Depending on the shape of consumer preferences and the firms’ cost functions, the equi-
1. Except for the case when U(p, q) = h(q) − p. In this case there is a unique quality offered and disper-
sionexists only in prices.
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librium dispersion of margins translates into the equilibrium dispersion of price and quality
pairs in the following way:
Case 1 Utility is strictly decreasing in p. In this case:
U(pi,g(pi)) > U(pj,g(pj))⇔ pi < pj
so that informed consumers will buy the cheapest product. Decreasing utility is consistent
with both increasing and decreasing g(p):
a) g(p) is increasing in p: this results in informed consumers choosing the lowest price
and the lowest quality as the marginal value of quality is low. Uninformed consumers get
higher prices and higher qualities.
b) g(p) is decreasing in p: in equilibrium informed consumers still buy the cheapest good
but now the good is of the highest quality. Uninformed consumers pay higher prices for a
lower quality compared to informed consumers.
Case 2: Utility is strictly increasing in p.
In this case the informed consumers buy the most expensive good, as the marginal value
of quality is high. This case corresponds to g(p) being strictly increasing. Uninformed
consumers on average buy goods of lower price and quality
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D: Instructions
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome to the Experimental Laboratory of Toulouse School of Economics.
This is an experiment on individual decision making.
Please read carefully the instructions and raise your hand if you have any questions or
doubts. It is important that you do not talk to any of the other participants in the room
until the experiment is over.
You will earn an amount of money that depends on your own and other people’s decisions.
The experiment consists of 3 phases, in each of which you will earn points. Your points
will accumulate over all the 3 phases of the experiment. You will be paid for each of the 3
phases.
Points will be converted into cash using an exchange rate of 10,000 points = 1 Euro.
Note that the more points an individual earns the more cash he will receive at the end of
the experiment.
You will receive the instructions for each phase at the beginning of that phase.
We will now distribute the instructions for Phase 1.
INSTRUCTIONS for PHASE 1
This phase consists of 20 periods.
In every period you will be a seller of a homogeneous good. There are 12 participants
in today’s experiment. You will be randomly matched every period into 6 markets with 2
sellers in each market, so that the participant who is the other seller in your market will
change randomly in every period. The buyers are simulated by computerized "robots".
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Trading Instructions
i. The cost of a unit of the good for the seller is zero. Therefore, every period you can
sell as many units of good as the buyers demand.
ii. In every period as a seller, you have to make two choices: the PRICE of the good and
the level of EFFORT (Ei) required for the buyers to observe the price and to compare
it with the price offered by the other seller in your market:
• The PRICE can be any integer from 0 to 100;
• The level of EFFORT should be chosen from the set {0;1;2;3;4;5}.The choice of
EFFORT is costless.
An example of the choice screen is given in the Figure below.
You have 30 seconds to submit your choice. Click on the Continue button to submit
your PRICE and EFFORT decisions. The computer will wait until all the sellers have
made their decisions before displaying the choices of the two sellers in each market.
3 The level of EFFORT chosen by the each of the two sellers determines how difficult
it is for buyers to observe and compare the prices in the market. Together with the
EFFORT choice of your competitor, your EFFORT choice contributes to the overall
average EFFORT buyers need to exert to observe and compare prices in the market.
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A level of average EFFORT of 0 corresponds to perfectly observable and comparable
prices, while a level of average EFFORT, say, of 3 makes it harder for buyers to observe
and compare the prices. Finally a level of average EFFORT of 5 makes it impossible
for buyers to observe and compare the prices.
iii. In every period, there are 20 identical robot buyers in each market. After the two
sellers in the market have made their PRICE and EFFORT decisions, each buyer will
purchase 4 units of the good. Buyers can be uninformed or informed.
Uninformed buyers do not observe the prices and buy an equal amount of 2 units from
each seller, independently of their price.
Informed buyers perfectly observe all the prices and purchase all 4 units from the seller
with the lowest price. If two sellers have the lowest price, the informed buyers purchase
an equal amount of 2 units from each seller.
iv. The number of uninformed and informed buyers in each period depends on yours and
your competitor’s EFFORT level choices. Buyers in a market become uninformed or
informed after the market average EFFORT level, Eav=
E1+E2
2
, is determined. More
precisely,
• the number of uninformed buyers is proportional to the average EFFORT level









• the higher the overall average EFFORT level, the more buyers become unin-
formed.
• the lower the overall average EFFORT level, the more buyers become informed.
For the exact number of uninformed and informed buyers under different levels of
EFFORT choices, refer to the table below.
Suppose that you are seller 1 in your market. The first column of the table indicates
your possible choices of levels of EFFORT (E1) for each choice of level of EFFORT of
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the other seller in your market. The second column indicates all the possible levels of
EFFORT chosen by the other seller in your market (E2).
EFFORT choice:
Average EFFORT





























































































































































6 At the end of every period you will see a "Result Screen" as shown in the Figure below.
The upper half of the “Result Screen” provides information about your market for the
period just completed. The displayed information highlights the two sellers’ PRICE
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offers (including yours), the corresponding EFFORT choices and the corresponding
good UNITS sold to uninformed and informed buyers respectively. The displayed
information is ordered from the lowest price to the highest price. Recall that you will
be randomly matched with a different seller in every period.
The lower half of the "Result Screen" contains information on your PROFIT earned
in the period just completed and on your Cumulative Profit earned in this Phase until
that period. To begin the next trading period, click on the Continue button on the
lower right corner of your screen.
v. Recall that the cost of each unit of the good is zero. Your PROFIT in each period con-
sists of two parts: a profit earned from selling to uninformed buyers (Profit_uninf)
and a profit from selling to informed buyers (Profit_inf). The two parts of PROFIT
are given by:
Profit_uninf =_PRICE_×_Number of uninformed Buyers_×_2 units
Profit_inf =_PRICE_×_Number of informed Buyers___×_4 units
vi. Your PROFIT at the end of each period is given by:
• if your price is not the lowest in your market,
PROFIT = Profit_uninf
• if your price is the lowest in your market,
PROFIT = Profit_uninf+Profit_inf
• if your price is the same as the price of your competitor in your market,
PROFIT = Profit_uninf + (Profit_inf ÷ 2)
vii. Recall that you will be paid the Cumulative Profit over all the 20 periods.
Example:
Suppose that in period t you choose PRICE = 50 and EFFORT = 2. Suppose the
other seller in your market chooses PRICE = 60 and corresponding EFFORT = 0.
The resulting market average EFFORT is (2+0)/2 = 1. The number of uninformed
buyers is then 4×1=4. The number of informed buyers is therefore 20-(4×1)=16.
Profit_uninf = 50 × ( 4 × 2 units ) = 400
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Profit_inf = 50 × (16 × 4 units) = 3200
Your price is the lowest on the market. Therefore in period t,
Your PROFIT = Profit_uninf + Profit_inf = 400 + 3200 = 3600 points
Are there any questions before we begin?
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Confusopoly: Price versus Product
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CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 2
2.1 Introduction
In standard models of competition, consumers are assumed to be perfectly able to compare
several offers and to choose the one with the highest value to them. Empirically, however,
studies have shown that consumers do not always choose the best offer. Consumers differ in
their preferences and also in the information they possess about prices and different product
attributes. In the literature, this phenomenon is attributed either to psychological biases or
to the searching costs of consumers, i.e. prior to purchasing any product, consumers incur a
cost of learning the relevant information. This in turn leads to positive mark-ups, price and
quality dispersion and suboptimal choices by some consumers.1 In these models, firms adopt
their strategic choices in the presence of uninformed consumers without directly affecting the
amount of information available to consumers. The introduction of free information sources
such as internet comparison sites should have diminished if not alleviated the problem by
fostering consumers’ comparison-shopping.
However, product comparison does not seem to have become easier. Product differenti-
ation, together with the increased variety of price structures and complex product features,
play an important role in assessing the net product value and do not facilitate the task
of cross comparison. In many markets, firms have the potential to make their offers in-
tentionally confusing by adopting complex price structures (price complexity) and product
attributes (product complexity).
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the incentives of firms to make their prices
and product features difficult to evaluate and to compare across competitors. Examples of
various price structures and product attributes can be seen in many sectors, including credit
offers in finance, mobile phone tariffs, the airfare industry and electricity contracts as well as
high tech products, computers, and mobile phones. However, consumers can face difficulties
in choosing the best product even in relatively simple markets. Consider a simple situation
of purchasing a shampoo from a large retailer. Which offer carries the best value: a shampoo
for everyday use for all types of hair for the price of 5 euros per bottle of 500 ml versus
a shampoo for fine hair for the price of 6 euros for the volume of 400 ml with a free trial
1. The main examples of these works include the "search-theoretic" models of Stigler (1961), Rothschild
(1973), Burdett and Judd (1983), and Stahl (1989, 1996) and the "information clearing house" models of
Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian (1980), Rothenthal (1980), Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2001).
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conditioner?
Manufacturers and retailers invest a considerable amount of time and money into oppor-
tunities to differentiate their products, leverage their brands, set strategic prices, and reduce
the effectiveness of consumer comparison across all offers. Costly comparison may affect
what kind of information consumers acquire prior to making their purchasing decision. If
market prices are too complex to understand, consumers may abandon the idea of price com-
parison and select a product with the highest matching value. On the other hand, if product
features are difficult to understand, consumers might simply invest in price comparison and
buy the cheapest product.
The question that we address is the following: if firms can influence consumers’ shopping
behavior by making price or product features (or both) easy or hard to compare with the of-
fers of their competitors, which dimension (if any) will they choose to complicate consumers’
shopping behavior, and under which conditions? Would the market outcome consist of more
complex and barely comparable offers, or would competition correct for consumer biases and
lead to more transparent market outcomes?
We distinguish between price and product complexity. Price complexity represents how
difficult it is for consumers to evaluate and compare prices across all the firms. It can reflect
the number of itemized fees included in the price structures of firms, or the complexity of the
frame being adopted — fees in small print, add-on prices, etc. Product complexity represents
how difficult it is to assess the matching values associated with product characteristic. It
can be thought of as the number of features included in the product, and how easily these
features and characteristics can be compared across products.
Scitovsky (1950) argued that sellers might have an incentive to confuse buyers by em-
phasizing the extent to which products differ and by stressing their technical, chemical or
functional complexity, i.e. making their product features appear more complex.
Several recent works look at the incentive of firms to make their pricing structures com-
plex. Carlin (2009) and Piccione and Spiegler (2009) find that firms adapt to the compet-
itiveness of the market by making their price structures intentionally confusing and thus
limiting the price comparison possible by consumers. A vast body of literature has analyzed
the incentives of firms to adopt the practices of price and product complexity. However to
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our knowledge, our paper is the first to consider the interaction between these practices in
a competitive environment.
We find that price and product complexities are substitutes rather than complements.
Firms that charge low prices tend to make their prices transparent but make product compar-
isons complicated for the consumer. Conversely, firms that charge high prices have incentives
to make their product features transparent but tend to introduce complexity in the price di-
mension. When the products are sufficiently differentiated, there is a middle range of prices,
such that firms have incentives to make their offers fully transparent and thus encourage
informed purchasing decisions.
The closest to our work in terms of modelling is Carlin (2009). In this paper, only a pro-
portion of all consumers are informed about the prices of homogeneous goods. Firms affect
this proportion by their individual choices of price complexity, thus exerting an externality
on the demand that other firms face. At equilibrium, price dispersion arises because firms
compete strategically for market share from both types of consumers. High price complexity
is chosen by the firms that charge high prices, with a fixed ex-ante probability that depends
only on the number of firms. We extend this analysis to the differentiated products, and
study the market outcomes when there are four types of consumers: fully informed, only
price informed, only product match informed, and fully uninformed consumers. Firms affect
each proportion of consumers by their individual choices of price and product complexity.
A number of works have considered a setting with heterogeneous goods, allowing firms
to control the information on product features. Lewis and Sappington (1994) show that
a monopolist might prefer not to provide any information about product characteristics,
however Ivanov, (2013) shows that in a competitive environment with firms being price-
takers, the market results in full disclosure of information about product characteristics
by all suppliers. Gabaix and Laibson (2004), on the contrary, show that if consumers are
subject to psychological biases, firms have incentives to make their products inefficiently
complex. Similarly, Spiegler (2006) demonstrates that if goods have multiple dimensions
and consumers cannot evaluate them all, firms have the incentive to make it difficult for
consumers to compare the value of the goods.
The first paper that analyses the incentives for firms to provide various types of informa-
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tion is that of Anderson and Renault (2000 b). The authors address similar questions in the
context of a single seller. At equilibrium, price-only and price-and-characteristic advertising
can arise depending on the relative strength of product differentiation and consumer search
costs. When the search costs are large and the firm must advertise to bring in consumers,
the firm may still prefer to keep consumers in the dark about how much they would like
the product. Even when the firm finds it optimal to inform consumers on both their match
values and the price level, the level of advertising is too small because the firm only accounts
for its private benefit per consumer informed when determining how much to advertise, and
not the extra benefit to consumers of making a valuable match.
Conflicting findings and the fact that product and price complexity have been analyzed on
a one-at-a-time basis, calls for a broader analysis of firms’ incentives to provide information
on each dimension of their offers. Our work contributes to the existing literature by making a
first step towards understanding the trade-off between price and product complexity choices
of competing firms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a model set-up. In Section 3
we characterize the equilibrium outcome, followed by the discussion in Section 4. Section 5
analysis relevant policy implications. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model set-up
We consider a market where n differentiated and risk neutral firms sell a substitute good
to a mass market of ex-ante identical consumers. The marginal costs are normalized to
zero. A unit mass of ex-ante identical and risk-neutral consumers has a unit demand and
a "matching value", vi, for the product produced by firm i. The matching value can be
either high (vH) or low (vL) with equal probabilities and is ex-ante unknown to both sides.
In this paper we consider highly differentiated products, such that vH ≥ 2vL. We further
provide some intuition as to the predictions of the model for the case when products are less
differentiated.
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the information they hold on firms’ price
and matching value. There are four types: uninformed, price shoppers, product shoppers and
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experts. Experts (φ) have full information on prices and corresponding matching values, price
shoppers (λ) have information on prices only, whereas product shoppers (µ) have information
on matching values only, and finally, uninformed (1−φ−λ−µ) consumers have information
on neither prices nor on matching values. Partitioning consumers into several groups based
on the information available to them is standard in the search literature and has been referred
to as an “all or nothing” search process or a “clearinghouse” search model. We follow Carlin
(2009) in allowing the firms to directly influence the information available to consumers.
Each firm, as well as choosing the “level” of its price, pi, chooses the “complexity”
of its price structure (price complexity), ρi ∈ [ρ, ρ], and of its product match (product
complexity), νi ∈ [ν, ν]. These choices are costless and remain the private information of
firm i. This assumption implies that adopting a certain framing does not convey information
about its individual complexity, but rather contributes to the overall market complexity in
an unobservable way. So, adopting a framing different to the competitor makes it harder to
assess all the offers, but does not identify which frame is more complex.
The proportion of each type of consumers is determined by price and product complexity
choices of firms. The effect of complexity on the consumer population is captured mathe-
matically as follows.
Assumption 1 The proportion of experts, price shoppers and product shoppers is deter-
mined as following:





















λ, µ,φ ∈ (0, 1).
This model can be viewed as a reduced form of the general set-up, where firms can di-
rectly influence the cost of obtaining information by consumers, and with consumers having
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heterogeneous costs of evaluating prices and product features. The behavior of consumers
can be explicitly modeled by introducing the cost of comparison among prices and product
features for consumers. Consumers can be thought of as heterogeneous in their costs of
obtaining price and product information. The costs of obtaining price and product infor-
mation (cp and cε) are identically and independently distributed across the population of
consumers. The aggregate market complexity may alter the distribution of consumers’ costs,
in a way that affects the equilibrium proportion of different types of consumers in a similar
manner to our assumption. Consumers observe their realized costs but do not observe the
actual aggregate market complexity levels, and thus cannot use aggregate market complex-
ity to infer information about the realized price distribution. Nevertheless, consumers form
rational expectations with respect to equilibrium price distribution. However, due to the
analytical complexity of the setting with respect to heterogeneous consumers, we present a
simplified version of the model, where the proportion of different consumer types is solely
determined by the firm’s choice of how easy it is to compare their offer with the offers of
competitors. From this, we abstract from the analysis of the individual consumer searching
decision. Nevertheless, consumers form rational expectations with respect to equilibrium
price distribution. However, due to the analytical complexity of the setting with respect to
heterogeneous consumers, we present a simplified version of the model, where the proportion
of different consumer types is determined solely by the firm’s choice of how easy it is to com-
pare their offer with the offers of competitors. From this, we abstract from the analysis of
the individual consumer searching decision. Nevertheless, we believe that fully endogenizing
the decision of consumers about information acquisition would result in similar qualitative
predictions. Consumers evaluate a certain dimension if, and only if, the expected benefit
of additional information exceeds the corresponding costs. In equilibrium, a population of
consumers would consist of four different types that differ in the amount of information that
they possess prior to their purchasing decision. A change in the cost of information acquisi-
tion affects the equilibrium proportion of each type of consumer. Having this interpretation
in mind, we introduce the set of assumptions that characterizes the relationship between the
proportions of different types of consumers, and the complexity choices of the firms.
The first part of the Assumption 1 states that the proportion of experts and price shop-
pers decreases with the firm’s individual choice of price complexity, while the proportion of
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product shoppers and uninformed consumers increases with the price complexity. Similarly
the proportion of experts and product shoppers decreases with product complexity, while
the proportion of price shoppers and uninformed consumers increases respectively.
The map in (2.1) implies that complexity choices by individual firms make it not only
difficult to understand the price and product match of that particular firm, but may also
make it more difficult to compare other competing offers. This assumption captures the idea
that each individual firm has an effect on the consumers’ cost of information acquisition
about other firms’ offers. The relevance of this assumption is immediate in the duopoly
setting. If firm 1 makes its price too complex to evaluate, less consumers will compare the
prices of two firms, and thus the proportion of consumers that are fully aware of prices (price
shoppers) would decrease. However, as the number of firms increases, the power of any one
firm to influence the proportion of different types of consumers is not obvious. The following
example demonstrates the relevance of this assumption in the oligopoly setting. Consider
a consumer who, prior to leaving home, wants to create a spreadsheet file that contains
information about prices and product features of all the firms in the industry. If all prices
and product features were to be presented in a unique standardized manner, then, once
all information is entered into the file, say from comparison sites, a special program would
convert prices and product features to a single comparable dimension. However, if one firm
adopts a different pricing frame to others, the program no longer works, and the consumer
needs search how to modify a program or alternatively to manually enter all the information
to the file. If this exercise is time and effort consuming, the consumer may abandon the idea
to compare prices.
Another demonstration of the relevance of the assumption that each firm has a unilateral
power to affect the number of different types of consumers is that the more complicated
the price structure of an individual firm, the more likely consumers are to miscalculate the
real price and thus to make uninformed choices (assuming that the firm cannot control the
direction of these mistakes). Therefore, by increasing its price complexity, each firm decreases
the likelihood of fully informed choices to be made by consumers, which in our setting
is translated into an increased proportion of uninformed consumers. Kayalci (2010) finds
experimental evidence that the rate of consumers’ mistakes increases as more firms adopt
complex pricing structures. The two examples demonstrate the relevance and applicability
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of Assumption 1 in practice.
The second part of Assumption 1 implies that the complexity choice of one firm does not
affect the inherent difficulty of evaluating a competing firm’s offer.
We assume that all consumers observe the actual matching value and price after the
purchase, and can return the product that they have purchased if the price exceeds the
valuation, i.e. consumers are protected by limited liability. We assume that the highest
price that firms can charge in the equilibrium cannot exceed vL. In Section 3.2 we provide
sufficient conditions on the proportion of experts and price shoppers such that charging the
price above vL is indeed not a profitable deviation and thus equilibrium prices are bounded
by vL.
Timing
In period 1, each firm i simultaneously chooses its price level, pi, the complexity of its pricing
schedule, ρi, and the complexity of its product characteristics, νi. Firms’ individual com-
plexity choices determine the resulting proportion of uninformed consumers, price shoppers,
product shoppers and experts. In period 2, matching values are realized and consumers make
their best purchase decisions based on the information available to them.
2.3 Equilibrium
We assume that all consumers observe the actual matching value and price after the purchase,
and can return the product that they have purchased if the price exceeds its valuation, i.e.
consumers are protected by limited liability.
Define J∗ and K∗ to be the set of firms who quote the lowest price and who have the
highest net value respectively in equilibrium. Let nj and nk be the number of firms in J
∗
and K∗, who split the demand from the price shoppers and experts equally.
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where the first term is the expected profit from the price shoppers: firm i gets all the price
shoppers, λ, if it charges the lowest price out of n firms. In the case when more than one
firm has the lowest price, each firm gets an equal share of price shoppers.
The second term is the expected profit from expected profit from product shoppers. Firm
i gets all product shoppers if it has the highest matching value and shares the proportion of
product shoppers with other firms in the case of a tie. Firm i has a matching value vH with
probability 1
2




















The third term is the expected demand from experts: firm i gets all the experts if it
offers the highest net value out of n firms and shares the demand in case of a tie.
Finally, the last term is the uninformed consumers. Firms equally share the demand
from uninformed consumers.
Note that from (2.4), firms earn the same expected margin on both product shoppers and
uninformed consumers.










(1− λ− φ)]. (2.6)
We continue the analysis without a loss of generality as if with only three types of
consumers. From herein, we refer to the total proportion of product shoppers and uninformed
consumers as non-price shoppers.
A quick examination of the payoff of firm i suggests that there is a positive mark-up
and price dispersion in the equilibrium, as some consumers do not observe prices and would
therefore still buy at the positive prices. At the same time, a positive proportion of price
shoppers ensure that a one-price equilibrium does not exist. The following Lemma formally
states this result.
Lemma 4 There is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Pure strategy equilibrium with zero profit cannot exist, as either firm can exploit
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the positive proportion of non-price shoppers (which it can unilaterally maintain by corre-
sponding complexity choice), and obtain a strictly positive profit. Thus in any equilibrium
there must be positive profits. Symmetric equilibrium with positive profits cannot exist as
either firm can slightly undercut its price and attract all the price shoppers (the positive pro-
portion of which is guaranteed by its corresponding complexity choices), keeping the demand
from product shoppers unchanged. The same arguments apply to asymmetric equilibria. In
the equilibria where one firm offers the lowest price, it has incentives to slightly increase its
price which results in a strictly higher profit. In the equilibria where several firms offer the
lowest price, firms have an incentive to slightly undercut their prices in order to gain a share
of price shoppers. Therefore, any equilibrium should be in mixed strategies and should be
characterized by positive profits.
The equilibrium price dispersion is a typical feature of the search models when some
consumers are uninformed about prices charged by individual firms. In this sense, our result
is similar to that of Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980), Stahl (1989) and Robert and Stahl
(1993). Note that product differentiation does not affect this result as products are ex-ante
homogeneous. We extend this argument to the setting with four types of consumers and
analyze the corresponding equilibrium choices of complexities by the firms. In the following
analysis, we concentrate on symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, where firms randomize
their prices and complexity choices. Intuitively, the asymmetric strategies are not consistent
with price dispersion because they imply that the distribution of prices charged by some
firms stochastically dominate those charged by other firms.2 Uninformed consumers do not
possess any information, therefore they buy a product from a random firm, as the expected
net value of all products is the same for them. Price shoppers do not possess information
on the realized matching values and buy the product with the lowest price, as in this case
the expected matching value is the same across all firms. Product shoppers do not possess
information on prices and buy the product that carries the highest matching value, as the
expected price is the same across all firms. Experts know all of the information and make
fully-informed purchasing decisions.
2. Baye, M.R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C.G.(1992). It takes two to tango: Equilibria in a model of sales.
Games and Economic Behavior, 493—510. doi:10.1016/0899-8256(92)90033-O
60
CHAPTER 2 2.3. EQUILIBRIUM
2.3.1 Profit
Denote by Λ(pi, ρi, νi,σ−i) and Φ(pi, ρi, νi,σ−i) the conditional expectations of λ and φ
respectively, given a choice of ρi, νi and pi of firm i and the equilibrium strategies of other
firms, σ−i. We suppress the arguments of Λ and Φ, unless it is necessary to make a specific
point. Further denote by Λ
p
the conditional expectations of λ , given a choice of ρi, νi, pi,
σ−i and that pi = pmin and by Φp the conditional expectations of φ given a choice of ρi, νi,
pi, σ−i and that vi − pi > max(vj − pj) for j 6= i respectively.
Given the equilibrium price distribution, F (p), the expected profit in (2.6) can be ex-
pressed as following:
Πi = pi[(1− F (p))n−1Λp +H(p)Φp +
1
n
(1− Λ− Φ)], (2.7)
where H(p) is the probability of firm i having the highest net value out of n products.
Whenever all of the firms have the same realization of vi the probability of having the
highest net value is equal to the probability of having the lowest price. Whenever firm i
has a matching value vL and at the same time any other firm has matching value vH , the
probability of having the highest net value is zero for this firm.
Whenever firm i has the highest valuation, then the probability of having the highest
net value is equal to 1. Whenever other firms have valuation vH together with firm i the
probability of having the highest net value is equal to the probability of having the lowest











(1− F )l + (1− F )n−1] = (1
2
)n[(1− F (p))n−1 + (2− F (p))n−1].
H(p) is strictly decreasing in p. Moreover, at the highest price of the equilibrium sup-
port, the probability of having the highest net value is positive and thus is higher than the
probability of having the lowest price, but at the same time is lower than the probability
of having the highest match, i.e. (1 − F (vL))n−1 < H(vL) < 1
n
.The opposite is true at the
lowest price of the support: the probability of attracting experts is lower than the probability
of having the lowest price but higher than the probability of having the highest match.
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2.3.2 Covered market
Note that the expression of the profit in (2.7) relies on the assumption that the market
is fully covered, i.e. the highest price that firms charge in the equilibrium cannot exceed
vL. We now characterize sufficient conditions on vL, and on the proportions of experts and
price shoppers such that charging any price above vL is not a profitable deviation and thus
equilibrium prices are bounded by vL. Assume that vL is the highest price charged in the






At a price higher than the highest price charged by other firms, firm i will attract experts
if and only if it has the highest valuation out of n firms and other firms have high enough
prices, i.e. with probability H(p′) < (1
2
)n, and it will keep all the uninformed consumers if
and only if its valuation is vH ,i.e. with probability 1
2
.



















p′ − vL . (2.8)
We further characterize the conditions necessary to guarantee that vL is the highest
price that firms charge in any equilibrium. Assume pmax > vL is the highest price of the









pmax − vL . (2.9)
The less restrictive out of the two conditions described above guarantees that the highest
charge priced in equilibrium is vL.
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The following proposition characterizes a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
of the price/match complexity game.
Proposition 5 (equilibrium) There exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
where firms choose their prices according to equilibrium price distribution F ∗(p) with the
support [pL, v
L] and there exists unique bp, bF and ep, eF such that:
i) Firms choose their complexity levels as follows:
ρ = ρ and ν = ν for p < ep
ρ = ρ and ν = ν for ep < p < bp
ρ = ρ and ν = ν for p > bp
such that ep = bp for n = 2 and ep < bp for n > 2.
ii) Firms choose a pair (ρ, ν) with a unique probability, eF ; a pair (ρ, ν) with a unique
probability bF − eF , and pair (ρ, ν) with probability 1− bF , which are given by:
dΛ
dρi










)n((1− bF )n−1 + (2− bF )n−1)], and (2.10)
dΛ
dνi










)n((1− eF )n−1 + (2− eF )n−1)] (2.11)
such that F ∗(bp) = bF and F ∗(ep) = eF .
iii) F ∗(p) is strictly decreasing in p and has no mass points.
Proof. We outline below the key arguments used to proof the proposition. Appendix A
contains a complete proof of the existence and full characterization of the mixed strategy
equilibrium.
2.3.3 Existence
A simple examination of (2.6) reveals that the payoff of each firm is continuous except in
the case when the price of firm i is the lowest on the market and is equal to the price of at
least one of the competitors, and when the price of firm i is such that several firms have the
highest net value. In this case, firm i can discontinuously increase (decrease) its profits by
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lowering (raising) its price. Note that the assumption that vH > vL implies that the point
of discontinuity arises only if several firms charge the same price which happens to be the
lowest price. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) show that i) the continuity of the sum of the
payoffs, and ii) the weak semi-continuity of each firm’s payoff guarantees the existence of the
mixed strategy equilibrium.
i) The continuity of the sum of payoffs is guaranteed by the fact that at the points
of the discontinuity the change in payoff serves as a transfer between firms that have the
lowest price or the highest net value on the market. In this sense, the game at the points of
discontinuity can be viewed as zero-sum game, since the sum of payoffs is continuous.
ii) Weak lower semi-continuity of Πi at the points of discontinuity holds since a lower
price than the one at which a tie occurs generates strictly positive profits.
2.3.4 Complexity choices
The profit of firm i increases with the proportion of price shoppers and experts if the prob-
ability of having the lowest price, and the highest net value is high enough. Therefore, for a
high probability of having the lowest price firms have incentives to maximize the expected
demand from price sensitive consumers. For a low probability of having the lowest price,
firms have incentives to minimize the proportion of price-insensitive consumers. The cut-off
probabilities are such that the change in the expected demand of price shopper and experts
resulting from an increase in the complexity levels is equal to the corresponding change in
the proportion of non-price shoppers. We show that the probability with which firms choose
different complexity levels depends on the number of firms in the market, and for n > 2
on the relative magnitude of the derivative of λ and φ with respect to complexity levels.
The maximum and minimum boundaries of the probability with which firms choose different
complexity levels depend only on the number of firms, and constitute a testable theoretical
prediction.
Low price complexity maximizes both the expected proportion of price shoppers and
experts at the same time and minimizes the proportion of non-price shoppers. High match
complexity maximizes the proportion of price shoppers but at the same time minimizes the
proportion of experts. Therefore, firms have incentives to minimize the proportion of price
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shoppers when the probability of having the highest net value exceeds the probability of
having the lowest price. Thus the two thresholds for price and match complexity choices
may not be the same. In the duopoly setting, the probability of having the lowest price is
equal to the probability of having the highest net value, therefore the two thresholds are the
same and equal to one half. For the highly differentiated product (vH > 2vL) and n > 2, firms
choose complex matching values less often than transparent prices. The corresponding prices
at which the probability thresholds are obtained characterize the price range for different
complexity choices of the firms. The uniqueness of equilibrium price distribution ensures the
uniqueness of the respective price thresholds.
In summary, for prices low enough firms have incentives to choose transparent prices and
complex product matches, and for prices high enough the incentives change towards complex
prices and transparent matches. For the middle range of prices, the resulting complexity
choices depend on whether bp is greater or smaller than ep. When the products are highly
differentiated for p ∈ [ep, bp], firms choose fully transparent offers, i.e. a pair of complexity
levels (ρ, ν). In Section 4 we discuss the robustness of these results for a low degree of product
differentiation.
The choice of the extreme values of complexity levels in equilibrium is driven by the
linearity property of λ, µ, and φ. However, the monotonic relationship between prices
and complexity levels described in Proposition 1 holds even when relaxing the linearity
assumption.
Restricting attention to either duopoly setting, or to the setting with only partially
informed consumers (i.e. the proportion of experts is zero), results in a unique threshold
for complexity choices, eF = bF . In this case, there is a one to one trade-off between price
and match complexity: firms choose transparent prices and complex match for p < bp and
complex prices with transparent match for p > bp. The ex-ante frequency with which firms




Note that our setting generates, as a particular case, a result that is identical to Carlin (2009)
in the price -complexity game with homogeneous products and two types of consumers: price
shoppers and uninformed. This result arises due to the additivity property of λ. Firms face a
trade off between price-sensitive and price-insensitive consumers. When prices are low more
weight is put on price-sensitive consumers, therefore the optimal complexity choice is such
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that maximizes the proportion of price shoppers, i.e. (ρ, ν) in our setting. Instead, when
prices are higher than bp, firms minimize the proportion of price shoppers and choose (ρ, ν)
respectively.
2.4 Discussion
When the proportion of experts is positive and the number of firms is greater than two, the
frequency with which firms choose transparent prices and complex matching values are no
longer equal, and firms choose to make their offers fully transparent with positive probability.
The numerical example below compares the frequencies with which firms choose different
complexity levels for n = 2 and n = 3 cases.
2.4.1 Complexity choices: example with n = 2 and n = 3.
For n = 2, the threshold for choosing transparent versus complex prices, and the threshold
for choosing complex versus transparent matching values, are given by:
bF = eF = 1
2
.
In the duopoly setting, firms never choose to be fully transparent. This is due to the fact
that the probability of attracting experts is always between the probability of attracting price
experts and attracting non-price shoppers. Therefore, firms only need to choose between
maximizing or minimizing the proportion of price shoppers and the expected proportion of
experts is irrelevant for the complexity choices.
Let us now consider the case of three firms, n = 3. For simplicity we consider a case when










In this case bF is determined as follows:
5
4
(1− bF ))2 + 1
4





1− bF ≈ 0.57.
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The expression for eF is:
3
4
(1− eF )2 − 1
4
(1− eF )− 1
8
= 0





In this case, firms choose a pair (ρ, ν) with probability eF = 0.39, fully transparent offers
with probability bF − eF = 0.04, and a pair (ρ, ν) with probability 1 − bF = 0.57. Compared
with a duopoly case, there is now a region where firms choose to be fully transparent, and
the frequency of choosing transparent prices decreases, whereas the frequency of choosing
transparent match values increases as a result. Note that as n increases from 2 to 3, the
frequency with which firms choose complex matches decreases, while the frequency with
which firms choose complex prices increases. This suggests that stronger competition, in the
sense of there being more firms on the market, leads to more transparent matching values
and to more complex pricing structures at the same time. However, in our example, the
frequency with which firms choose fully transparent offers increases. Therefore, the overall
impact of more intense competition on market transparency requires further investigation.
The following proposition formally states this result for any number of firms. For simplicity,
we keep the symmetry assumption, however we believe that the result is robust without
imposing a symmetry property, but this would require a more detailed investigation.
2.4.2 Competition and complexity
Proposition 6 ENTRY EFFECT: When the number of firms increases, F (ep) and F (bp)
decreases. The difference (F (ep) and F (bp)) if ep > pL, and decreases otherwise. In the limit,
when n goes to infinity both price thresholds approach pL, and the frequency with which firms
choose complex price/transparent match approaches to one.
Proof. Appendix B
Increasing n decreases the probability of having the lowest price faster than the proba-
bility of having the highest net value, or the probability of attracting product shoppers and
uninformed consumers. Therefore, as n increases, firms decrease the frequency of choos-
ing the complexity pair that maximizes the proportion of price shoppers. Therefore as n
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increases firms decrease the frequency of choosing the complexity pair that maximizes the
proportion of price shoppers. As n increases further, the probability of attracting experts
becomes smaller than (1/n) and thus firms more often choose a pairing of complexity that
maximizes the joint proportion of product shoppers and uninformed consumers.
Proposition 5 implies that a higher proportion of firms will add complexity to their prices
and make their products more transparent when there is greater competition. Thus, we can
draw a novel empirical prediction from the analysis: industry concentration should be neg-
atively correlated with price complexity, and positively correlated with product complexity,
ceteris paribus. In our experimental study of price complexity game in the homogeneous
goods setting, we find evidence of negative correlation between industry concentration and
price complexity. However, for intermediate values of n, increasing n leads to a higher fre-
quency with which firms choose fully transparent offers, and therefore can in fact result in
a more transparent market. As n approaches infinity, this frequency approaches zero, and
therefore the market outcome is characterized by complex prices and transparent matching
values.
This result should be interpreted with a certain degree of caution as the relationship
between the proportions of different types of consumers and complexity levels is given ex-
ogenously in our setting, and, thus, does not capture the effect of a change in price dispersion
when the number of firms increases.
2.5 Policy implications
The following section explores how regulation in the form of a complexity cap (lower ρ and ν)
or a complexity floor (higher ρ and ν) would affect the price distribution and the aggregate
market complexity. . Complexity levels can be regulated by introducing a respective cap on
how complex each offer can be, i.e. standardizing the framework for representing prices and
product features, or alternatively, by inducing the disclosure of full information by firms for
the purposes of creating a comparison technology that allows the reduction of comparison
to fewer dimensions. Ease of comparison can also be potentially controlled by imposing a
floor on how complex the offers can be. For example, forbidding comparative advertising
can impose a limit on how transparent the market is. We characterize the conditions under
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which these policies lead to an increase or decrease in prices.
Proposition 7 (Complexity regulation) Imposing a cap on price complexity or a floor on
product complexity decreases equilibrium prices. Imposing a cap on product complexity or a
floor on price complexity increases equilibrium prices.
Proof. The respective thresholds for complexity choices are independent of the complex-
ity choices, and depend only on the number of firms and on the degree of product differenti-
ation. Therefore, the regulation of complexity levels affects price distribution via the effect
on the proportions of different types of consumers and not via the change in the frequency of
choosing different complexity levels. The higher the proportion of price insensitive consumers
(product shoppers and uninformed consumers), the more firms put weight on higher prices.
The higher the proportion of price shoppers, the more weight firms put on lower prices. The
net effect on price distribution due to the change in the proportion of experts is less clear cut.
On the one hand, the lower proportion of experts relaxes price competition. On the other
hand, a lower proportion of experts may lead to a higher proportion of price experts, and
therefore more intense price competition. Therefore, the net effect depends on the relative
change of the proportion of other consumers when the proportion of experts changes. A
decrease in price complexity increases the amount of price shoppers and experts, and de-
creases the amount of product shoppers and uninformed consumers. Therefore, the policy
that decreases the upper bound or increases the lower bound of the price complexity leads
to higher and lower prices respectively. As the product complexity increases, a proportion
of price shoppers increases, while the proportion of experts decreases. In this case, the joint
proportion of uninformed consumers and product shoppers is unchanged (Assumption 1 ). A
reduction in the proportion of experts is fully absorbed by an increase in the proportion of
price shoppers. Given that the latter are more price sensitive, the firms have more incentive
to put more weight on lower prices. As a consequence, the decrease in the upper bound of
product complexity leads to higher prices, while the increase in the lower bound of product
complexity leads to lower prices respectively.
Below is the plot of F ∗(p) for n = 2, vL = 100 and different values of ρ, ν and ρ, ν. We
take as a baseline ρ = ν = 1 and ρ = ν = 0.
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It can be seen from Figure 1 that the price distribution shifts up (prices decrease) as a
cap on price complexity or a floor on product complexity is imposed. The threshold price
for complexity choice shifts left. When a cap is imposed on product complexity instead
or a floor on price complexity, the price distribution shifts down (prices increase), and the
threshold price shifts to the right.












A regulator that wants to decrease market prices, should set a ceiling on price complexity,
i.e. how complex firms can go in their price structures, or a product complexity floor, i.e.
to limit the extent to which firms can make their product transparent. Instead, setting a
cap on product complexity can result in an adverse effect on price distribution and market
prices consequently increase.
2.5.1 Welfare implications
The welfare effect depends crucially on whether or not the reduction in prices is more impor-
tant for consumers than the disutility of the ‘bad’ match. When price complexity decreases,
all consumers benefit from price reduction. However, the proportion of product shoppers
decreases, therefore there are fewer consumers that have information about the best match
value. Thus, the proportion of consumers that switch from product shoppers to price shop-
pers benefit from lower prices, but at the same time choose less often the best match value.
If the disutility of consumers from a mismatch is lower than the additional utility from lower
prices, then policies that lower prices are socially desirable. However, if the mismatch results
in a higher disutility than the relative gain in prices, consumers can be better off from the
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policies that encourage match comparison, even if the latter triggers higher prices. For ex-
ample, if the utility of consumers is given by v−p, as implicitly assumed in our setting, then
the loss of a consumer from a mismatch is greater than any possible price reduction. There-
fore, the net effect on consumer welfare depends on the relative change in the corresponding
consumer proportions times the net benefit for each type of consumer.
2.5.2 Lower product differentiation
We have provided the analysis for the market that is characterized by a high degree of
product differentiation. The remaining question is what happens in the middle range of the
equilibrium price support, when products are moderately differentiated, or more precisely
when vH − vL < vL.
A lower dispersion of valuations affects the probability of attracting experts, H(p). If this
probability increases with respect to the probability of attracting price shoppers, then the
above results are reinforced. However, if this probability decreases sufficiently as a result of
lower valuation dispersion, then the two probabilities would cross at a higher price, so that





(1− F (p)) + 1
4
(1− F (p+ vH − vL)) + 1
4
(1− F (p− vH − vL))
Note that it is greater than in the case when vH − vL > vL if [2 − F (p + vH − vL) −
F (p − vH − vL)] > 1, which in turn depends on the equilibrium properties of F (p). For
a sufficiently low price range the probability of attracting price shoppers remains high so
firms choose the complexity levels that maximize a proportion of price shoppers. As price
increases this probability decreases, however H(p) decreases sufficiently fast so that the
probability of attracting price shoppers becomes lower than the probability of attracting
non-price shoppers, 2
n
, before crossing H(p). In this case, it becomes more profitable for
firms to minimize the proportion of experts in the middle range of prices, and at once switch
their complexity choices to those that maximize the proportion of non-price shoppers.
As n increases, H(p) presumably would decrease slower than (1−F (p))n−1, and the gap
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between the two decreases. In this case, there can be a shift to a full transparency range for
some intermediate values of n. Thus, as n increases, the two price thresholds approach each
other until ep again becomes lower than bp. However, more detailed analysis is needed before
drawing any conclusions. Due to the technical complexity of the task, we leave this analysis
beyond the scope of this paper.
2.6 Conclusions
The adopted framework allows us to analyze the incentives of firms to obfuscate price or
product features and to predict the change in the market structure as a result of new entries
or regulatory interventions. The reduced form analysis sheds light on the trade-off that firms
choose when deciding which information to make available for consumers.
The existing literature on obfuscation shows that firms choose to limit the product net-
value comparison by consumers. However, the dimension that firms might obfuscate is
usually exogenously chosen: either price or product features. In this paper, we provide an
analysis of firms’ incentives to limit comparison by consumers of the net value of differenti-
ated products. The firms choose which dimension, if any, they obfuscate. We find that price
and product complexities are substitutes rather than complements. Firms either choose to
limit price comparison or product comparison. The equilibrium results in a mixed pricing
strategy by firms, and the choice of price and product complexity is determined by the prices
of the individual firms, the equilibrium distribution of the prices, and the number of com-
peting firms. Firms that charge low prices choose transparent prices, however much they try
to limit comparison of their product features with those of competing firms. In other words,
when choosing low prices, firms tend to encourage price shopping and limit the extent to
which their products are viewed as niche products by consumers, in order to maximize the
share of consumers that make their purchasing decisions based on price comparison. Firms
that charge prices in the middle range of the equilibrium support, choose fully transparent
products in the case of highly differentiated products, and possibly choose fully complex of-
fers in the case of low product heterogeneity. Whereas firms that charge higher prices tend to
encourage consumer shopping based on product features comparison, by making their price
structures complex and their products transparent. Having a transparent product guaran-
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tees some captive consumers for the firm on the one hand, and limiting price comparison
relaxes price competition on the other hand. The frequency with which the firms choose
different complexity levels depend only on the number of firms, and the relative change in
the proportion of price shoppers and experts from the change in the complexity levels. In-
formation on the number of firms is sufficient to derive testable theoretical predictions as
boundaries of the frequency with which firms choose different complexity levels. When the
number of firms increases in the market, the choice of complex prices and transparent prod-
ucts becomes more frequent, as the probability of winning the price competition decreases
for each firm when the total number of firms increases. Therefore, this results in consumers
making suboptimal choices on a price dimension.
The policies targeted at regulating price and product complexity have different predic-
tions as to the effect on equilibrium price distribution. We consider two relevant policies:
a cap on the upper limit of price or product complexity; or a floor on the lower bound of
price or product complexity. Our analysis shows that imposing a cap on price complexity
or introducing a floor on product complexity results in lower market prices. In the case of
the imposition of a cap on product complexity and a floor on price complexity, the effect on
aggregate market complexity levels is the same, however market prices increase as a result.
When product complexity is regulated, consumers shift from price comparison to product
comparison, which in turn relaxes price competition for firms and therefore results in higher
market prices. Even though both policies lead to more transparent markets, regulating price
complexity appears to be more efficient for lowering market prices than regulating product
complexities. Together, with the result that increasing the number of firms leads to more
complex and higher prices, the efficiency advantage of price complexity regulation becomes
more pronounced. However, the impact on consumer welfare remains ambiguous, in the case
of a high disutility from the ‘bad’ product match. Our analysis constitutes a first attempt
to analyze market outcomes when firms directly influence the information available to con-
sumers prior to purchasing decisions. A richer model is needed in order to access in detail
the net impact on consumer behavior and total welfare.
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2.7 Appendix
A: Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
A.1 Existence and uniqueness
Proof.
i. The expected profit of firm i is given by:
Πi(pi, ρi, νi|σ−i) = p([1− F (p)]n−1Λp +H(p)Φp +
1
n
(1− Λ− Φ)). (2.12)
A simple examination of (2.12) reveals that the payoff of each firm is continuous except
in the instances when the price of firm i price is the lowest on the market and equals the
price of at least one of the competitors. In this case, firm i can discontinuously increase
(decrease) its profits by lowering (raising) its price. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the mixed strategy equilibrium in the
games with multi-dimensional strategy set in the case of such discontinuities (Theorem 6*):
i) the continuity of the sum of payoffs;
ii) the continuity of each firm’s payoff and weak semi continuity at points of discontinuity
(when several firms charge the lowest price or happen to have the highest net-value).
We now outline the intuition as to why these conditions are satisfied.
i) The continuity of the sum of payoffs is guaranteed by the fact that at the points
of the discontinuity the change in payoff serves as a transfer between firms that have the
lowest price or the highest net value on the market. In this way, the game at the points of
discontinuity can be viewed as zero-sum game, as, the sum of payoffs is continuous.
ii) Note that the payoff is continuous in complexity levels. Weak lower-semi continuity of
Πi in price demands that the deviation to the lower prices at the points of discontinuity to be
profitable. Consider that the point of discontinuity is such that at this price firm i shares the
proportion of price experts with nj firms, but keeps its proportion of experts. Deviating to a
lower price than the point of discontinuity results in a strictly positive profit, as it is at this
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price that firm i keeps the demand from non-price shoppers and experts unchanged and gains
all the price shoppers. For prices close enough to the point of discontinuity, the deviation
is strictly profitable. Now consider that a tie occurs at the price such that firm i shares
a proportion of it price shoppers with nj firms, and a proportion of experts with ni firms.
Then, the deviation to the lower price in the neighborhood of the point of discontinuity is
even more profitable than in the case when firm i shares only the demand of price shoppers.
Therefore, weak lower semi-continuity of Πi holds.
Strictly decreasing in p
Proof. Suppose there exists an interval [pa, pb] within [0, v
L] such that F (pb) − F (pa) = 0.
Then for any p̃ such that pa < p̃ < pb, [1−F (p̃)]n−1 = [1−F (pa)]n−1. Since p̃[1−F (p̃)]n−1 > pa
[1−F (pa)]n−1and p̃[1− (1−F (p̃))n−1] > pa[1− (1−F (pa))n−1], then there exists a profitable
deviation. Thus, F (pb)− F (pa) 6= 0 for any interval [pa, pb] within [0, vL].
No mass points
Proof. If some p is charged with a positive probability, then there is a positive probability of
a tie at p. Note that there cannot be a positive mass at a price that results in zero profits, as
any positive mass on the price slightly higher will generate positive profits. Consider a point
mass at any p ∈ (0, vL]. It must be the case that the number of mass points is countable.
Then there exists a price slightly smaller (by ε) than p that is charged with the probability
zero. Consider a deviating firm charging p with probability zero and p − ε with a positive
probability. Such deviation increases the demand from price shoppers while keeping the
demand from product shoppers unchanged, and thus profitable. Therefore, in equilibrium,
no mass points can exist.
Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium price distribution
Proof. Denote by Λ(pi, ρi, νi,σ−i) and Φ(pi, ρi, νi,σ−i) the conditional expectations of λ
and φ respectively, given a choice of ρi, νi and pi of firm i and the equilibrium strategies of
other firms, σ−i. Further denote by Λp the conditional expectations of λ , given a choice of
ρi, νi, pi, σ−i and that pi = pmin and by Φp the conditional expectations of φ given a choice
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of ρi, νi, pi, σ−i and that vi− pi > max(vj − pj) for j 6= i respectively.Let Φ and Φ denote Φ
when firm i chooses (ρ, ν) and (ρ, ν) respectively. Then equilibrium price distribution should
be such that firms are indifferent between any price charged. F (p) is determined by:
p[(1− F (p))n−1Λp + (
1
2






























(1− Λ(ρ, ν)− Φ(ρ, ν))]






(1− Λ(ρ, ν)− Φ(ρ, ν)) .
Note that pL is a singleton and is independent of F (p).
Therefore to show that F (p) is unique, it is sufficient to show that it is unique for any p
of the support [pL, v





(1 − Λ − Φ)], which does not vary with p. The left hand side (LHS) of
(2.13) for a given p is strictly decreasing with F , as both Λp(ρ, ν) and Φp(ρ, ν) are strictly
decreasing with F .
In order to prove the uniqueness of F (p), it is sufficient to show that there is a unique F
that satisfies (2.13). Let F = 0, then at p = pL LHS should be equal to RHS by definition
of F (p), while at p > pL, LHS is strictly greater than the RHS when F = 0 for any p on
[pL,v
L]. At the same time at F = 1, the LHS is strictly smaller than RHS at p < vL. Given
that the LHS is strictly decreasing with F, there exists a unique F , that satisfies (2.13).
A.2 Complexity choices
Proof. Below we provide a detailed proof for the choice of complexity levels. The proof
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consists of three parts. We first analyze the firms’ choice of price complexity, followed by
the analysis of match complexity choice. We finalize the proof by showing that bF ≥ eF .
Price complexity






























can be simplified to:
dΛ
dρi










< 0, (2.15) equal to zero when ((1 − F (p))n−1 +H(p) − 2
n
) is equal to zero. Several
results follow immediately from the properties of H(p) and ((1− F (p))n−1 discussed above.
Both ((1 − F (p))n−1 and H(p) are strictly decreasing in price, therefore (2.15) is strictly
increasing in price. At the lowest price of the equilibrium support, pL, F (pL) = 0 and
therefore [(1−F (pL))n−1− 1n ] > 0 and H(pL) is greater than 1n , therefore (2.15) is negative.
At p = vL, F (vL) is equal to one, and H(vL) is lower than 1
n
, therefore (2.15) is positive.
Combining this result with the fact that (2.15) is strictly increasing in price, concludes the











] = 0. (2.16)
For p > bp, (2.15) is positive, and firms choose ρ = ρ. For p < bp, firms choose ρ = ρ, while at
p = bp firms are indifferent between all price complexity levels.
Match complexity













































> 0 while dΦ
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. It is reasonable to assume that an increase in product complexity generates
higher absolute change in the proportion of price shoppers than in the proportion of experts.
When match complexity increases, experts shift towards price comparison, while product
shoppers become either price shoppers or remain uninformed. The change in the proportion
of price shoppers, therefore, accommodates both the change in the fraction of experts and the
change in the proportion of product shoppers that have switched towards price comparison.
Therefore, dΛ
dνi
should be greater or equal to dΦ
dνi
. Keeping this assumption in mind, we can
examine a sign of (2.18) at pL and v
L. Thus, applying the properties of H(p) discussed
above, at pL, (2.18) is positive, while at v
L it is negative.
Both ((1 − F (p))n−1 and H(p) are strictly decreasing with p, with (1 − F (p))n−1 being
greater than H(p) at p = pL and (1 − F (p))n−1 being smaller than H(p) at p = vL. Plug-
ging the expression for H(p) and rearranging the terms results in following condition that
characterizes ep:



























The first term of the LHS of (2.19) is positive and strictly decreasing in p, while the
second term is negative and also strictly decreasing in p but at a lower rate than the first
term, as dΛ
dνi
> 0. There exists a unique p such that for p > p the first term is greater than
the second term, and for p < p the first term is smaller than the second term. Therefore,
for p < p the LHS of (2.19) is decreasing in p, while for p > p, the LHS is increasing in p.
At p = p the LHS= 0, and is smaller than the RHS, therefore ep should be smaller than p.
Therefore, ep ∈ [pL, p). At this range of prices, the LHS is strictly decreasing, therefore on
this interval the LHS crosses the RHS only once and at ep. We now have to show that for
p ∈ [p, vL) the LHS does not cross the RHS. Note that on this interval the LHS is strictly
increasing in p, and at vL the FOC (2.18) is negative. Thus, the LHS and RHS do not cross.
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Therefore, for p > ep, (2.18) is negative, and firms choose ν = ν. For p < ep, firms choose
ν = ν, while at p = ep firms are indifferent between all the match complexity levels
Comparison of thresholds













[(1− eF )n−1 − 1
n
]. (2.20)
Note that the sign of (2.20) depends on the sign of (1− eF )n−1 − 1
n
.
A picture below plots the value of (2.18)at F = 1− ( 1
n
)n−1.








FOC wrt to ν evaluated at F = 1− ( 1
n
)n−1
The sign of (2.18) at this value is negative, therefore eF must be lower than 1 − ( 1
n
)n−1
and therefore (2.20) is positive, which implies that bF must be greater than eF , and therefore
ep < bp.
B: Proof of Proposition 2








), eF is given by:
(2n − 1) 1n−1 − 2
(2n − 1) 1n−1 − 1
< 1.
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The derivative of eF with respect to n is given by:





(2n − 1) 1n−1 − 1)2
< 0.
In the limit when n goes to infinity F (ep) goes to 0.
As both (1
2
)n−1(1 − F (bp))n−1 and (1
2
)n−1(1 − F (bp))n−1 decrease with n faster than 1
n
,
F (bp) decreases with n as well. Figure (2.7) plots FOC for ρ for different values of n and F.
Note that the value of F such that this FOC are equal to zero ( bF ) decreases with n and
approaches zero for n large.







n _1 0 0 0




Note from the figure (2.7): the difference (F (bp)− F (ep)) increases with n, until F (ep) reaches
zero. This implies that the frequency with which firms choose transparent offers increases
with n until F (ep) reaches zero, and decreases thereafter. At the same time, the frequency
with which firms choose transparent price/complex match decreases, while the frequency
with which firms choose complex price/transparent math increases, and in the limit when n
goes to infinity, reaches one.
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System and the Right to Remain
Silent

CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 3
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we compare the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems of law enforcement.
The differences in the way the US and European Union (EU) antitrust authorities operate
is our primary application. The motivating example for our analysis is based on merger
control. In the US, federal and state courts decide on cases prosecuted by national agencies
(Federal Trade Commission in our example). In Europe, competition law enforcement is
most often an administrative process in which agencies, such as the European Commission,
also make decisions.1
In the adversarial system of law, the DM—typically a court—does not collect the evidence
itself, and rules based on the information provided by the opposing parties (e.g. a US
administration body versus a firm). In contrast, in the inquisitorial (or the administrative)
system of law, the DM relies on its administration to gather information both favorable and
unfavorable to the firm.
However, the EU law enforcement system is not truly inquisitorial since the European
Commission as a DM compensates for the relative absence of well organized plaintiffs, and
acts to some extent as a prosecutor.2
The European Commission’s dual role as a prosecutor and judge is heavily criticized by
practitioners and legal scholars alike. For example, Venit (2009) considers that the dual role
of the Commission together with the ‘all-too-human tendency of any regulatory agency to be
biased by its raison d’être’ are the main factors that negatively affect the quality of evidence
collection in the administrative system.
In this paper, we investigate whether or not a DM prefers its agent (i.e. its administra-
tion) to be biased when gathering and submitting evidence (and thus act as an adversary to
the firm), or instead to be neutral (and thus complement the firm’s (biased) information).
In the existing literature, the two systems are usually considered in their extreme in-
terpretation. The adversarial system is represented by two polarized parties who gather
information and engage in the strategic disclosure of evidence, and a DM who passively
1.Also, final decisions can be appealed in both jurisdictions. In this paper we abstract from the appeal
process.
2. Neven (2006) refers to this as the inquisitorial model with prosecutorial bias.
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rules based on the provided information. The inquisitorial system of law is instead repre-
sented by a single agent whose objective is to seek the "truth" by collecting evidence, with no
room for information disclosure by the parties with a stake in the matter. Relying on such a
representation of the two systems of law, Shavell (1989), Shin (1994, 1998), Dewatripont and
Tirole (1999), and Gromb and Martimort (2007) find that the adversarial system performs
better in terms of the quantity of information revealed, and thus the level of precision of the
final decision.
However, experimental evidence available to us contradicts the superiority of the ad-
versarial approach, and finds only weak empirical evidence in favor of its superiority. For
example, Lind, Thibaut and Walker (1973) run a series of experiments to study the relative
performance of the two systems. They find that on average, the adversarial system is more
robust to the DM ’s bias, but that it does not lead to more information. The adversarial
system does not seem to instigate more searches for information, even though it does lead
to advocates who are initially confronted with unfavorable evidence to exert greater effort.
The key novelty of our framework consists of allowing the interested party to submit
information in both systems of law enforcement. In practice, antitrust enforcement proceed-
ings in either system contain elements in common. One such common element is the right
for interested parties to submit any information relevant to the case. The right to remain
silent, in the sense of withholding the incriminating evidence, also applies to both systems
of law enforcement. Finally, in both systems, the law enforcement agencies are meant to
represent the public interest, and arguably respond exclusively to the incentives provided by
their respective institutional arrangements.
We adopt the informational framework of Angelucci (2012) to compare the performance
of the two systems. There are two pieces of evidence available to the parties, which, if
they are gathered and revealed, serve as an informative signal about the underlying state of
nature. The two parties, the administration and the firm, exert costly effort to (possibly)
come into possession of no, one, or two pieces evidence.
The first party is an independent agent that has an intrinsic interest to convince the DM
to rule in her favor (e.g. a firm). The second party is an expert (e.g. an administration),
to whom the DM delegates information acquisition responsibilities. The expert is a priori
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indifferent to the final decision, and reacts only to the monetary incentives provided by
the DM . In our motivating example, based primarily on merger control, the first party
represents a firm that notifies the merger and the second party represents the case team of
the enforcing authority.
By choosing the judicial system, the DM chooses a remuneration scheme for the expert.
Under the adversarial system the agent is remunerated if the final decision is unfavorable to
the independent agent. In contrast, under the inquisitorial system, the agent is remunerated
based on the amount of information delivered. In addition, we allow for parties to choose
whether to look only for favorable information, only for unfavorable information, or for any
type of information, through their choice of information acquisition technology (either general
or specialized). Acquiring information of a certain type (either favorable or unfavorable) is on
average more likely when using specialized technology than when using general technology.
We characterize the equilibrium of the game, and provide conditions under which one
system performs better than the other with respect to the level of precision of the final
decision, net of the total cost of information acquisition.
Both systems have a number of advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of
the adversarial approach is that sound competition between the two opposing parties forces
both parties to exert a higher level of effort, and to develop special skills necessary in order
to acquire evidence in support of their best interests. This leads to a higher amount of
information produced, and therefore a higher level of precision for the final decision.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that when parties have opposing interests, where
evidence necessarily favors one side over the other, all relevant information ends up being
disclosed.
We find a similar result in the sense that the effort levels of both parties are strategic
complements under both systems. The effort of the firm, for a given level of effort by the
expert, is higher under the adversarial system. However, the full disclosure result found in
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) rests on the assumptions that evidence is non-manipulable, and
is costless to obtain.
We show that the higher level of effort exerted by the firm in the adversarial system of
law is not sufficient to offset the loss of information arising from the strategic withdrawal of
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useful information by the expert. The amount of information revealed under the adversarial
system is higher than under the inquisitorial system if, and only if, the specializing search
technology sufficiently increases the likelihood of finding evidence of the desired type. A
higher level of precision comes at the cost of effort, which is the main disadvantage of the
adversarial approach.
The main strength of the inquisitorial system of law is the unbiased acquisition of ev-
idence by the expert, and also presumably, the more accurate decisions that follow. We
show that less information of higher accuracy can lead to a superiority of the inquisitorial
approach over the the adversarial approach.
We find that for a low relative efficiency of specialized technologies, the inquisitorial
system is always superior to the adversarial one, resulting in both a higher level of precision
of the final decision and lower total costs. In contrast, if specialized technologies are highly
efficient, the difference in the two systems is non-monotonic in the levels of equilibrium efforts
of both parties. The adversarial system performs better for sufficiently low and high levels of
equilibrium efforts, whereas the inquisitorial system remains superior for intermediate levels
of effort. The intuition for this result can be summarized as follows: for highly efficient
specialized technologies, the adversarial system of law always leads to a final decision of
higher accuracy, but with higher costs. For low values of equilibrium effort of the firm, the
increase in the level of precision of the final decision always offsets the associated increase
in costs. This result is reversed as the effort of the firm increases. Finally, when the effort
levels of both parties are sufficiently high, the two systems have the same equilibrium levels
of effort (and therefore costs), but the level of precision of the final decision is higher under
the adversarial system. The main determinants of the equilibrium efforts are the stakes
of the parties, i.e. the profit of the firm and the compensation of the expert that in turn
depends on the loss of a DM from an erroneous decision.
Further, we show that for a range of parameters, the DM can increase its total payoff
by committing not to accept the evidence of the independent party. In these instances, the
inquisitorial system naturally dominates the adversarial one.
In our setting, we restrict attention to the allocation of the burden of proof by rule. We
assume that if no evidence is submitted by two parties, the DM rules in the favor of firm,
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i.e. the burden of proof is born by the expert. We further relax the exogenous allocation of
the burden of proof and characterize the conditions under which such an allocation can arise
as an equilibrium outcome. We find that under the inquisitorial system, such allocation of
the burden of proof will never arise in equilibrium, while it constitutes an equilibrium under
the adversarial system for low enough values of the equilibrium effort of the independent
agent. Indeed in practice, such allocations of the burden of proof are more typical for the
adversarial system, but less so for the inquisitorial system.
Our analysis provides supportive arguments and additional justification for the non-
adversarial system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the set-up. Section 3
analyses the equilibrium of interest and the level of precision of the final decision under the
two systems. Section 4 discusses the endogenous allocation of the burden of proof. Section
5 concludes.
3.2 Set-up of the model
3.2.1 The parties
We consider a set-up with three risk neutral players: persuader F , persuader E and decision-
maker DM . The motivating example of our analysis is based on merger assessment. Thus,
it is convenient to interpret persuader F as a firm that notifies a merger and persuader E as
an expert team of antitrust authority. The DM in our case is either a judge or an antitrust
agency that takes a formal decision either to clear or to block a merger, m = 1 or m = 0
respectively. F receives a positive profit Π if the merger is cleared (m = 1) and 0 otherwise.
Based on merger control example, our model stays fairly general and applies to a number of
different settings.
The state of nature ω can be either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ω ∈ Ω = {g, b}. The DM incurs a
loss L from blocking the merger if the state is ‘good’ and clearing the merger if the state
‘bad’. In case of a correct decision, the DM ’s loss is zero. E is a priori indifferent about
whether the merger is cleared or not. She responds only to monetary incentives from the
DM .
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3.2.2 Information structure
There are two pieces of decision-relevant information that pertain to the case: x and y. The
evidence in our setting represents a verifiable piece of hard information. The first piece of
evidence, x, is drawn from a countable set X. The second piece of evidence, y, is drawn from
a countable set Y. The whole set of evidence is denoted by z = (x, y), and is drawn according
to the joint pdf fω(z), with marginal probabilities gω(x) and hω(y).
Further, a set X can be divided into two subsets: Xg and Xb, where X ≡ Xg ∪ Xb so
that x ∈ Xg (respectively, x ∈ Xb) if gg(x) > gb(x) (respectively, gg(x) < gb(x)) and in this
case x is referred to as ‘good’ (respectively, ‘bad’). Similar dichotomies apply to Y and Z.
Information acquisition
To acquire information the parties exert unobservable and unverifiable effort, ei, at a cost
C(ei).
3 The DM cannot obtain information on his own but can delegates the evidence
collection to his expert E in exchange for monetary remuneration. Both F and E potentially
have access to both pieces of evidence. The evidence gathered by party F or E is that party’s
private information. In addition, F and E can choose to disclose (or not) any evidence at
their disposal. The submission involves some arbitrary small costs c per piece of evidence
submitted.4 TheDM rules based on the evidence submitted by persuaders. In the case when
no evidence is submitted, the DM rules in the favor of the firm by a rule, which is public
information. In this case we say that party E carries the burden of proof. In this paper, we
do not provide the analysis under alternative allocation of the burden of proof. However,
we do provide some intuitive predictions for this case, which is discussed in more detail in
Section 4. No evidence submission is the only instance when the DM can commit ex-ante
to a decision rule. We assume that the DM cannot commit to any particular decision rule
ex-ante if one of the parties submits any evidence.
There are two technologies available for information collection: general (g-technology)
and specialized (s-technology). The choice of technologies is unobservable to the DM . The
two technologies differ in the probability of obtaining ‘good ’ and ‘bad ’ evidence.
3.We assume C(ei) to be increasing and convex.
4. The positive costs serve to break the indifference between the decision to submit the evidence that does
not affect the final decision or to not submit.
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Upon exerting effort ei and using g-technology, persuader i comes into possession of only
x with probability αei, only y with probability αei, both x and y with probability αei and
acquires no evidence with probability 1− 3αei, where α ∈ (0, 13 ]. Parameter α represents the
efficiency of g-technology. The ex-ante probabilities of finding ‘good’ or ‘bad’ evidence when
using g-technology are thus equal.
S-technology in turn allows the parties to specialize their search on either ‘good’ or
‘bad’ evidence. The probability of finding a desired type of evidence using s-technology,
conditional on the fact that this evidence exists, is higher than using general technology,
while the probability of finding an undesired type of evidence is lower. Conditional on the
fact that there exists a desired piece of evidence, persuader i comes into possession of only
this piece of evidence with probability α(1+s)ei. Similarly conditional on the existence of an
undesirable piece of evidence, persuader i finds only this piece of evidence with probability
α(1 − s)ei. If the realized evidence is such that both pieces of evidence are favorable (or
unfavorable) to persuader i, she obtains both pieces with probability α(1+s)ei (or α(1−s)ei)
and finds nothing with probability[1 − 3α(1 + s)ei] (or [1 − 3α(1 − s)ei]) respectively. If
two pieces of evidence happen to be conflicting, then persuader i comes into possession of
both x and y with probability αei and finds nothing with probability 1 − 3αei. Parameter
s determines a relative degree of specialization of s-technology with respect to g-technology,
such that α(1 + s) ∈ (0, 1
3
]. If s = 0, both technologies are identical.
It is important to stress that the ex-ante probability of obtaining a specific type of
evidence is independent of the state of the nature. Conditional on the fact that this evidence
exists, the probability of obtaining it is the same in both states. Therefore, the equilibrium
strategies of the evidence collection and submission should be independent of the state of
nature.
Having two different technologies reflects the idea that one can choose a certain direction
of research. Consider testing a drug, where one can run a number of trials in order to test
a concrete effect without looking for all the possible side effects. In the merger example,
the analysis conducted by the firm can be oriented towards quantifying the efficiency gain
and less so towards the coordinated effects. A lawyer who has developed an expertise in a
narrow domain is more likely to be hired in this domain than a lawyer with a more general
training.
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Remuneration schemes
There are two observable outcomes for which contracting is possible: a final decision and
submitted evidence. We restrict our attention to two remuneration schemes: a decision-based
scheme and an information-based scheme. Only these two schemes appear to be relevant, as
contracting on the type of evidence is not effort enhancing, and the choice of the latter is
not conditional on the prevailing state.
The judicial system is adversarial when E’s remuneration is conditional on the final
decision and is inquisitorial when E’s remuneration is conditional on the amount of evidence
submitted.
3.2.3 Timing of the game
The game proceeds as follows:
1. Nature draws ω and z; their realizations are unobserved by all players.
2. The DM chooses a remuneration scheme (thus, judicial system).
3. F and E choose a search technology and invest in evidence acquisition.
4. The parties decide whether to submit (all or part of) their evidence.
5. The DM rules.
3.2.4 Payoffs
Let νω(eF , eE) denote the probability that the merger is cleared given the state of nature ω.




E} be the vectors of monetary transfers from the DM to E under the adver-
sarial and inquisitorial systems accordingly. Note that under the adversarial system, the
DM will pay a positive wage to the agent E only if the final outcome is different from the
one in the case when no evidence was submitted, i.e. if, and only if, the merger is blocked.
Under the inquisitorial system, the DM will pay a positive wage if, and only if, the agent
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submits two pieces of evidence. In order to ensure the submission of acquired evidence, the
wage for two pieces of evidence should be higher than the wage for one piece of evidence.
Otherwise, E would always withhold the second piece of evidence. It is sufficient to remu-
nerate a small submission cost in order to ensure the submission of one piece of evidence.
Therefore, in order to ensure a positive effort, it is sufficient to remunerate the agent (with
the wage greater than the submission costs) only if both pieces of evidence are submitted.
Under the inquisitorial system, E’s will receive wIE with the probability that she acquires
two pieces of evidence and 0 otherwise, and that she would incur the corresponding costs of
the effort.




(2− νg − νb)wAE − C(eE). (3.1)




(νg + νb)Π− C(eF ). (3.2)




(1− νg + νb)L− C(eF )− C(eE). (3.3)
3.3 Equilibrium
Throughout the analysis, we assume that the burden of proof is allocated on E by rule,
i.e. in the absence of any evidence submitted the merger is cleared. Later, we relax the
assumption that the allocation burden of proof is exogenous and will examine whether or
not such a decision can constitute an equilibrium.
3.3.1 Equilibrium concept and putative equilibrium
We focus on pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium, in which:
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1. F submits x only if x ∈ Xg, and y only if y ∈ Y g.
2. E submits x only if x ∈ Xb, and y only if y ∈ Y b.
If the DM observes only x (or only y), he allows the merger if, and only if, x ∈ Xg (or
y ∈ Y g), and blocks the merger otherwise. If the DM observes z, he allows the merger if,
and only if, z ∈ Zg, and blocks the merger otherwise.
3.3.2 Analysis
Given the putative equilibrium behavior of the DM, we first characterize the persuaders’
submission strategies and choice of searching technology in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 respec-
tively. Lemma 3 summarizes strategic complementarities that arise during the information
acquisition stage. Proposition 1 then establishes the existence of the conjectured equilibrium.
We further provide the conditions on off-the-equilibrium beliefs such that this equilibrium
survives the trembling hand refinement, i.e. the equilibrium still exists even if the parties
make submission mistakes with a negligible probability.
Further assumptions and notations
The possible realizations of evidence can be classified into four events. Evidence is said to
be consistent and favorable to F (event 1, with probability p1,ω), whenever the pair (x, y)
is such that x ∈ Xg and y ∈ Y g. Evidence is said to be consistent and unfavorable to
F (favorable to E) (event 4, with probability p4,ω), whenever the pair (x, y) is such that
x ∈ Xb and y ∈ Y b. Evidence is instead said to be conflicting whenever (x, y) is such that
either x ∈ Xg and y ∈ Y b or x ∈ Xb and y ∈ Y g. In this case, evidence is nevertheless
overall favorable to F (event 2, with probability p2,ω) if z ∈ Zg, and overall unfavorable to
F (event 3, with probability p3,ω) if z ∈ Zb.
Finally, we assume that (i) distributions are symmetric in the sense that p1,g = p4,b,
p4,g = p1,b, p2,g = p3,b, and p3,g = p2,b; and (ii) such that p1,g > p4,g and p2,g > p3,g. Appendix
B provides an example of the distribution of x and y that results in the joint distributions
that satisfies our assumptions.
Lemma 8 i. Persuader E submits all the evidence that she acquires under the inquisi-
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torial system.
ii. Persuader F and persuader E submit the minimum amount of evidence favorable to
them under the adversarial system.
Proof.
i. The first part of the lemma is trivial and follows immediately from the definition of
the inquisitorial system.
ii. When the payoff of a persuader is conditional on a final decision, it is worth submitting
any acquired evidence if, and only if, it increases the chances to revert an otherwise
unfavorable final decision. An unfavorable piece of evidence either does not affect
or reverts an otherwise favorable decision, thus persuaders never submit unfavorable
evidence to them. Submitting a favorable piece of evidence that does not affect the
chances of reverting an unfavorable outcome only triggers a positive cost of submission,
and therefore only a favorable piece evidence that increases the chances of ‘winning’
would be submitted. Therefore, if two pieces of favorable evidence are acquired, only
one piece of evidence would be submitted.
Consider first persuader F in the case where F acquires two pieces of evidence. Submit-
ting a favorable piece of evidence reverts an unfavorable to F outcome if, and only if: i)
the evidence is conflicting but overall favorable to F ; and ii) E submits an unfavorable
piece of evidence. In this case, F would submit a favorable piece of evidence only if
the evidence acquired is conflicting and overall favorable to F (event 2 ). Consider
the case when F acquires only one piece of evidence and it turns out to be favorable
to F . Then, submitting it either does not affect or increases the chances of reverting
an otherwise unfavorable decision if event 2 is realized. Thus, when F acquires one
favorable piece of evidence it always submits it. Consider now the incentives of per-
suader E. Submitting ‘bad’ evidence reverts an otherwise unfavorable final outcome
to E in more instances than for persuader F , as E carries the burden of proof. A
‘bad’ piece of evidence, if submitted, always reverts an otherwise unfavorable decision
to E in the following events: evidence is conflicting and overall unfavorable to F (event
3); evidence is consistent and unfavorable to F (event 4 ); and if evidence is overall
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unfavorable to E but F fails to submit a ‘good’ evidence. Therefore, if E acquires at
least one piece of ‘bad’ evidence, she always submits it.
Prior to evidence acquisition persuaders choose a searching technology. The next Lemma
characterizes persuaders’ choices. We assume that once indifferent between the two tech-
nologies, persuaders choose g-technology. This assumption can be supported by introducing
an arbitrary small fixed cost k for adopting s-technology.
Lemma 9 (choice of search technology) Persuader E chooses s-technology under the
adversarial system and g-technology under the inquisitorial system, while persuader F always
chooses s-technology.
Proof. The ex-ante probability of acquiring two pieces of evidence when using g-
technology is equal to that when using s-technology. Therefore under the inquisitorial system,
persuader E is indifferent between the two technologies, and thus chooses g-technology. Un-
der the adversarial system, the ex-ante probability of acquiring a desirable piece of evidence
is greater when using s-technology than when using g-technology. Therefore, F always uses s-
technology. Similarly, for persuader F, the probability of acquiring a ‘good’ piece of evidence
is higher when using s-technology.
Building on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can now write the corresponding payoffs of
the parties under two systems. Note that the DM has no monetary constraints, and the
wage serves as a pure transfer from the DM to E. Therefore in each system, the DM can
always set such w∗AE and w
∗I
E that implement the first best level of effort, given the choice of
remuneration scheme and the effort of persuader F . From now on, we will therefore refer to
the DM ’s first best level of effort as E’s effort evaluated at w∗AE and w
∗I
E . We will abstract
from E’s payoff in the rest of the analysis and refer to eE as if chosen directly by the DM





[1− (p4,b − p4,g)(3αeE)− (p2,g − p2,b)αeE(1 + 2αeF )](−L)− C(eF )− C(eE) (3.4)
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[1− p2,ω(αeE(1− (2α)eF )− p3,ω2αeE − p4,ω3αeE]Π− C(eF ). (3.5)
The payoff of theDM can be written as the loss from an erroneous decision in the absence
of evidence net of the difference between the correction of existing errors and production of
new errors due to submitted evidence. When no evidence is available, the DM always takes
the decision in favour of F , therefore failing to block the merger when the state is bad (type
I error), but avoiding to block the merger in the good state (avoiding type II errors). By
taking into consideration available evidence, the DM reduces type I errors and increases
type II errors, so that the level of precision of the final decision increases as a result. In the
event where both pieces of evidence are favorable to F (event 1 ), the acquisition of evidence
does not bring any new information, and does not affect the decision of the DM . However
in the event where both pieces of evidence are unfavorable to F , acquiring at least one piece
of evidence prevents an erroneous decision if the state is ‘bad’, but increases the error if the
state is ‘good’. Due to the fact that this event is more likely in the ‘bad’ state, submitted
evidence decreases the expected error. In the event when evidence is conflicting but overall
favorable to F , the DM increases type II error if F fails to find a positive piece of evidence
(with probability (1−2αeF )) and E finds only a negative piece of evidence (with probability
αeE) in the ‘good’ state and decreases type I error otherwise. Finally in the event when
evidence is conflicting but overall unfavorable to F (event 3 ), finding a negative piece of
evidence (with probability 2αeE) reduces type II error in the ’bad ’ state and increases type
I error in the ’good’ state, with the latter being less likely. Note that the reduction of errors
in the event 3 is greater than the increase in the errors in the event 2, therefore the level of




p1,ω the evidence is consistent and favorable to persuader F (event




p2,ω, evidence is conflicting but overall favorable to F (event
2 ). In this case, F loses only if she does not obtain a favorable piece of evidence (this
happens with probability (1− 2αeF )) and at the same time, E obtains the only unfavorable




conflicting but overall unfavorable to F (event 3 ). Under such a scenario, F wins if E does
not obtain the unfavorable piece of evidence (this happens with probability 2αeE). Finally,
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p4,ω, both pieces of evidence are unfavorable to F . In this case, F wins

















p1,ω evidence is consistent and favorable to persuader F (event 1 ).




p2,ω, evidence is conflicting but overall favorable to F (event 2 ). F always
wins, except in the event when she fails to obtain a favorable piece of evidence and E succeeds




p3,ω, evidence is conflicting but overall unfavorable to F (event 3 ).
Under such a scenario, F wins if E does not obtain the unfavorable piece of evidence (this
happens with probability (2 + s)αeE). Finally, with probability
P
Ω
p4,ω, both pieces of
evidence are unfavorable to F . In this case, F wins only if E fails to obtain any evidence
(this happens with probability (1− 3α(1 + s)eE)).
Note that for equal levels of efforts of parties under the two systems and for s = 0,
the two systems differ only in the level of precision of the final decision in the event 2. The
inquisitorial system protects F more often from being mistakenly accused and fails to accuse
more often when F is guilty. Anticipating this, F has incentives to exert more effort for
evidence collection under the adversarial system, all else being equal.
The following Lemma formally summarizes the nature of strategic complementarities pre-
vailing in this game under the two systems. Throughout the analysis, we adopt a quadratic
specification for the cost function such that C(ei) =
1
2
e2i . However, our results apply to a
more general convex cost function.
Lemma 10 (reaction functions) The efforts of the parties are strategic complements.
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αL[3(p1,g − p1,b) + (p2,g − p2,b)(1 + 2αeF )]. (3.11)
The first thing to note is that it is the existence of two pieces of evidence that drives
the non-zero effort level of both persuaders. If only one piece of evidence is available, only
the party that carries the burden of proof would exert a positive level of effort under both
systems. The fact that an otherwise unfavorable decision can be reverted if extra piece
of information is provided drives the incentive of both persuaders to invest in information
collection.
F’s reaction function
Persuader F has a chance to revert an otherwise unfavorable decision by providing ad-
ditional evidence if E obtained an unfavorable piece of evidence, and if evidence is overall
favorable to F . Thus, the higher the chances that E will acquire and thus submit only a
negative piece of evidence in the event that such evidence is overall favorable to F (p2,ω),
the higher is F ’s effort. Note that the probability that E will submit only a negative piece
of evidence is greater under the adversarial system than under the inquisitorial system.
Thus for a given eE, the effort of F is greater under the adversarial system than under the
inquisitorial system.
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E’s reaction function
E’s reaction function evaluated at w∗AE and w
∗I
E , represents the DM ’s constrained first
best choice of E’s effort, which increases with F ’s effort under both systems. As F increases
her effort, the probability of the DM blocking the ‘good’ merger decreases, and each extra
unit of E’s effort contributes to a further reduction of type II errors, i.e. allowing ‘bad’
merger. Under the adversarial system, type II errors are more likely than under the inquisi-
torial system. Therefore, an increase in F ’s effort triggers sharper a reaction, and thus a
larger increase in E’s effort. So, the increase in F ’s effort triggers a larger increase in E’s
effort under the adversarial system.
For a given level of F ’s effort, first best DM ’s effort is higher under the inquisitorial
system for s small and under the adversarial system for s large enough. The efficiency of an
additional unit of E’s effort under the adversarial system in bringing up useful information
increases with s. When the degree of specialization is relatively low, an extra unit of E’s effort
is more efficient under the inquisitorial system than under the adversarial system. Under
the inquisitorial system E is not being strategic enough, and reveals all of the information
that she acquires. Therefore, in this case, the DM prefers E to incur a higher effort under
the inquisitorial system than under the adversarial system. As the degree of specialization
increases, the probability of acquiring and thus submitting favorable evidence increases under
the adversarial system. An extra unit of E’s effort becomes more efficient in producing
useful information, and thus the optimal level of the DM ’s effort increases. For s sufficiently
large, the DM chooses a higher effort of E under the adversarial system than under the
inquisitorial system.
The following proposition shows that the above conjectured equilibrium exists, and that
the DM reaches its decision as if being a fully Bayesian player.
Proposition 11 (Existence of Equilibrium) i) There exists a pure strategy equilibrium,
in which along the equilibrium path the DM reaches its conjectured decision as if based solely
on the informativeness of submitted evidence, and this equilibrium is unique of its kind. In
the case of no evidence submitted the DM rules in favor of F by rule. This equilibrium can
be supported by the off-equilibrium beliefs that support the conjectured decision.
ii) This equilibrium survives a trembling hand criterion as long as e∗AE is low enough.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
A simple decision rule leads to the same final decision as if a DM would have updated
his rational beliefs based on the information at his disposal, and based on the anticipated
equilibrium behavior of both parties. Two factors drive this result: i) both states are equally
likely and all the players share common priors; and ii) the information acquisition efforts of
both parties, together with the choices of searching technology, are not conditional on the
state of nature, and therefore the informativeness of the evidence submitted outweighs the
strategic considerations. Appendix A contains a detailed proof of this result and specifies
the off-equilibrium beliefs that support this equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium is
robust, even when allowing for a small probability of submission mistakes by the parties,
i.e. it survives a trembling hand refinement. The DM , when faced with an unexpected
deviation, believes that a persuader mistakenly discloses evidence with a certain probability.
We show that such off-equilibrium beliefs are sufficient to sustain the equilibrium under
the inquisitorial system. Under the adversarial system, such beliefs sustain the equilibrium
only if the equilibrium effort of E under the adversarial system (e∗AE ) is low enough, i.e.
if the degree of the specialization of s-technology or Π, or L are high enough. For e∗AE
sufficiently high, additional assumptions are needed on the off-equilibrium beliefs in order to
sustain the equilibrium. For example, when E fails to submit any evidence, the DM (if fully
Bayesian), would always rule in the favor of F . If E equilibrium is high under adversarial
system, then the probability of her finding a desirable piece of evidence, conditional on it
existing, is sufficiently high. Therefore the fact that E did not submit any evidence under
the adversarial system is more likely to suggest that E found a ‘good’ piece of evidence, and
therefore withholds it. E is more likely to find a ‘good’ piece of evidence in a ‘good’ state
than in a ‘bad’ state, therefore the DM should clear the merger independently on what type
of evidence F submitted in this case. However, the behaviour of the DM off-equilibrium
path does not affect the equilibrium outcome, as F does not have incentives to deviate
and submit unfavorable to her evidence. If DM ’s beliefs are such that when faced with the
unexpected deviation by the firm and no evidence submitted by the expert, the DM believes
that the mistake is more likely in the ‘bad’ state than in the ‘good’ state, this would sustain
the equilibrium for the adversarial system, even for high equilibrium efforts of the expert.
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3.3.3 Comparison of two systems
Proposition 1 states that under both systems, a simple decision rule that the DM applies
constitutes a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. However, which system generates a higher
DM ’s payoff requires further examination. Lemma 3 shows that for a given level of E’s effort,
persuader F exerts higher effort under the adversarial system than under the inquisitorial
system. More effort triggers a higher level of precision of the final decision, ceteris paribus.
However, more effort also affects the effort decision of the other party and in addition triggers
higher costs. From Lemma 3, E’s equilibrium effort (for a given eF ) is lower under the
adversarial system for s low enough. Therefore, a necessary condition for the adversarial
system to generate a higher DM ’s payoff is that a higher F ’s effort should result in a higher
level of precision of the final decision, i.e. it should result in fewer errors. If this condition is
violated, the inquisitorial system would always result in a higher DM ’s payoff, as it involves
lower total costs. However, a higher level of precision is only a necessary condition. A
sufficient condition would require that a marginal increase in the level of precision of a final
decision due to a higher effort outweighs the corresponding increase in the total costs. The
following proposition characterizes the level of precision of a final decision under the two
systems.
Proposition 12 (payoff of DM) 1.For s = 0 the inquisitorial system always generates a
higher level of precision of the final decision, and therefore a higher DM ’s payoff than the
adversarial system.
2.There exists bs < 1, such that for s > bs the level of precision of a final decision under
the adversarial system is higher than under the inquisitorial system.
Proof. Appendix C.1.
When both technologies are equally efficient in obtaining different types of evidence,
more evidence is expected to be submitted under the inquisitorial system. A higher effort
of persuader F is not sufficient to outweigh a lower effort of persuader E in this case.
Intuitively, this occurs due to the fact that a unit change in E’s effort generates a higher
change in the expected quantity of the evidence submitted than a unit change in F ’s effort.
In the adversarial system, both persuaders are strategic, and submit only favorable evidence
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to them, while under the inquisitorial system, expert E submits all the information acquired.
This result is reversed when the degree of the specialization of s-technology increases. In this
case, the efficiency of the unit of effort with respect to the information submitted increases for
the adversarial system. Therefore, the adversarial system results in a higher than expected
amount of evidence revealed by the persuaders.
The next proposition characterizes the conditions under which the increase in the total
cost associated with higher effort is lower than the increase in a precision of a final decision.
Proposition 3 therefore defines the sufficient conditions under which the adversarial system
results in a higher DM ’s payoff.
Proposition 13 1. For s > bs and e∗IF sufficiently small the adversarial system results in a
higher DM ’s payoff.
2.For e∗IF = e
∗A
F = 1 there exists es < 1, such that for s > es the adversarial system results
in a higher DM ’s payoff.
Proof. Appendix C.2
The proof is based on several arguments. Using the fact that the DM ’s payoff under
the adversarial system increases with s, we show that for a given level of e∗E (if F exerts
no effort, i.e. Π = 0), there exists bs such that the adversarial system results in a strictly
higher DM ’s payoff for s > bs. The difference in the level of precision of the final decision is
strictly positive and linear in e∗F while the difference in costs is zero. Applying the continuity
property of the DM ’s loss and cost function in e∗F and e
∗
E we argue that for Π slightly higher
than zero, this result still holds. As Π increases, the adversarial system results in higher
costs and the inquisitorial system generates a higher DM ’s payoff.
Figures 1 and 2 below provide a numerical example of this result for a quadratic cost
function:
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Figure 1
The DM ’s payoff under the adversarial system increases in the degree of specialization of
s-technology, and crosses the DM ’s payoff under the inquisitorial system for Π low enough.
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However, as Π increases, F ’s probability of obtaining no evidence reaches zero and there-
fore the effort is at maximum under the two systems. We show that for the same level of
costs, the adversarial system generates a higher level of precision of the decision for s high
enough, and therefore a higher DM ’s payoff.
Propositions 2 and 3 state that the necessary condition for the adversarial system to
dominate the inquisitorial system is the high degree of specialization of s-technology, i.e.
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research specialization should substantially increase the probability of obtaining a desired
type of evidence, given that it exists. For a low degree of specialization, a higher effort of the
firm for a given effort of the agent does not offset the loss of information from the strategic
‘silence’ of the latter under the adversarial system. Given that the degree of specialization
is sufficiently high, the adversarial system will perform better than the inquisitorial system
if, and only if, the stake of the firm is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high. Thus, the
increase in the level of precision of the final decision offsets the corresponding increase in
the costs of effort. For the intermediate values of F ’s stake, the increase in the level of
precision of the final decision is not sufficient to offset the respective increase in the costs,
and therefore the inquisitorial system dominates the adversarial system, even for a high
degree of specialization.
Note that for Π high enough, the DM ’s payoff under both systems is lower than if
the decision was taken randomly, due to the higher costs of a joint effort. If the DM could
commit to not take into consideration evidence submitted by F , he would increase his payoff.
Figure 3 demonstrates this point.










If the DM commits to not take into consideration F ’s evidence and if the burden of proof
is allocated to E, the inquisitorial system results in a higher DM ’s payoff for low degree of
specialization of s-technology, and vice versa.
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3.4 Burden of proof
We now relax the assumption that the burden of proof is exogenously imposed on the players,
and investigate whether or not such an equilibrium spontaneously arises.
Proposition 14 (No evidenciary rules) 1. Under the adversarial system, for Π suffi-
ciently small, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which the decision maker reaches its
decision ‘as if’ based solely on the informativeness of the submitted evidence
2. Under the inquisitorial system, the allocation of the burden of proof on E can never
arise as an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Appendix D.
The intuition for this result is similar to the one described above for the trembling hand
criterion. The allocation of the burden of proof on E leads to the latter extracting more
effort than F , for Π sufficiently small. In this case, under the adversarial system, the DM
is rationally inferring from the fact that E is not disclosing evidence (despite her being the
better informed persuader), that she is in fact withholding unfavorable information, and thus
rules in favor of F . In practice, the adversarial system adopts such an allocation of burden
of proof quite frequently. However, under the inquisitorial system, E would not withhold
any information, and thus E does not submit any information only if she does not succeed
in obtaining it. On the other hand, F does not submit any information either if she did
not find any information or she found negative information, or if she found two pieces of
evidence and the evidence is unfavorable to her. This situation is more likely to occur in
the bad state, and thus ruling in favor of F is not consistent with a Bayesian update of
information. Therefore, the DM should be able to commit to a rule of allocation of burden
of proof. A natural extension would be to conduct a similar analysis in the case when
the burden of proof is carried by F , i.e. if no evidence is submitted, the DM blocks the
merger. It appears that such an allocation of the burden of proof can arise as an equilibrium
outcome under the inquisitorial system, which justifies the frequent use of such an allocation
of the burden of proof in the inquisitorial system. The efforts of persuaders are strategic
substitutes in this case. However, the existence of an equilibrium described in Proposition
1 requires more detailed examination, which we intend to complete as the next step of our
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work. We further aim to investigate the performance of both systems under the alternative
allocation of the burden of proof. The intuition suggests that the inquisitorial system would
further increase its performance in this case. This calls for a comparison of the performance
of the inquisitorial system, under the alternative allocation of the burden of proof , with
the adversarial system, under the actual allocation of the burden of proof.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we compare two judicial systems: the adversarial and the inquisitorial. By
choosing between two remuneration systems, a decision-maker encourages an agent to either
be biased or neutral with respect to a defendant. We depart from the standard literature on
this topic by allowing the defendant to submit the acquired evidence under both systems,
and by allowing for a broader informational structure. We motivate our set-up by a merger
control example, where the defendant is the firm that wants to merge with another firm, and
the agent is the competition agency in charge of the investigation. Both the agency and the
firm invest in the acquisition of hard evidence. An additional piece of information, once ac-
quired, can revert the DM ’s decision to block or to clear the merger. This triggers strategic
complementarities in the effort choices of both parties. The adversarial arrangement results
in the firm exerting a higher level of effort, all other things being equal. On the one hand,
a higher level of effort means more information on the firm’s side; while on the other hand,
it triggers higher costs. At the same time, the agent withholds the acquired information in
the case where it is unfavorable to her, and therefore some information is wasted. Under the
inquisitorial arrangement, theDM ’s agent is not strategic and submits all of the information
that she acquires. We have characterized the equilibrium of this game under both systems.
The DM applies a simple rule for a final decision that appears to be fully consistent with
the Bayesian updating of the beliefs based on the available information. We characterize the
necessary and sufficient conditions for one system to be superior to another in terms of the
level of precision of the final decision, net of the associated costs from the acquisition of the
information. We find additional supportive arguments for the inquisitorial system, which
always dominates the adversarial system if the specialized searching technology available to
the parties is not efficient to obtain a desired type of evidence. In this case, the inquisitorial
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system results in more precise final decision-making, as well as in a lower cost of the infor-
mation acquisition. If the degree of the specialization of the s-technology is high enough,
then the adversarial system generates a higher level of precision of the final decision, and
at the same time, higher costs. The difference in the net DM ’s payoff under both systems
is non-monotonic in the equilibrium effort of the firm. We show that either for sufficiently
low values or for sufficiently high values of the equilibrium effort of the firm, the adversarial
system dominates the inquisitorial system. For the intermediate values of F ’s equilibrium
effort the conclusion is reversed, and the inquisitorial system results in much lower costs of
the level of precision. We also show that for high values of the equilibrium efforts of the
parties, the DM might be better served by committing to not consider the information pro-
vided by the firm. These results are generated under a certain assumptions about the DM ’s
final decision in the absence of any evidence. In particular, we have assumed throughout
the analysis that if no evidence is submitted, the DM rules in the favor of the firm and
clears the merger. Our results are further reinforced under the alternative allocation of the
burden of proof, but the detailed comparison of the performance of the two systems in this
case is left for future research. We show that such an allocation of the burden of proof can
arise as the equilibrium outcome under the adversarial system, but can never arise under
the inquisitorial system, and thus should be maintained as a commitment. This result pro-
vides additional intuition as to why the inquisitorial system seldom allocates the burden of
proof to the prosecuting party. A more detailed exploration of these only partially-addressed
questions shapes our future research opportunities.
3.6 Appendix
A: Proof of Proposition 1
The evidence submission strategies stated in Lemma 1 were characterized under the assump-
tion that the DM takes his decision as following:
a) Under the inquisitorial system and under the adversarial system for the values of L
and Π such that the equilibrium effort of eE is low enough.
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1. decides to allow the merger, i.e. sets m = 1, if in a possession of either nothing or
x ∈ Xg, y ∈ Y g, or z ∈ Zg, and
2. decides to disallow the merger, i.e. setsm = 0 if in possession of either x ∈ Xb, y ∈ Y b,
or z ∈ Zb.
b) Under the adversarial system for the values of L and Π such that the equilibrium
effort of eE is sufficiently high.
1. decides to allow the merger, i.e. sets m = 1 if expert E fails to obtain any evidence
or if in a possession of either nothing or x ∈ Xg, y ∈ Y g, or z ∈ Zg.
2. decides to disallow the merger, i.e. sets m = 0 if in possession of x ∈ Xb, y ∈ Y b, or
z ∈ Zb and expert E submits at least one piece of evidence.
We now must verify that such behavior indeed constitutes an equilibrium under the two
systems. We first analyze behavior and corresponding beliefs on the equilibrium path, tak-
ing evidence submission strategies as stated in Lemma 1. We then show that this behavior
remains optimal off-equilibrium path, assuming that, when faced with an unexpected devia-
tion, the DM believes that a submission mistake was made with probability ǫ (per piece of
evidence mistakenly submitted).
Equilibrium path
On the equilibrium path under both systems, the DM may either receive the whole set of
evidence z, one piece of evidence (x or y), or nothing. The decision m = 1 constitutes
an equilibrium if EUDM(m = 1) > EUDM(m = 0), which implies that conditional on the
evidence submitted, the ‘good’ state is more likely to prevail than the ‘bad’ state.
Let ez be the pair of evidence submitted by the parties.
The conditional probability that the state of nature is ‘good’ given the submitted evidence
is:
P (ω = g|ez) = P (z = ez|ω = g)P (ω = g)
P (z = ez) . (3.12)
The conditional probability that the state of nature is ‘bad’ given the submitted evidence
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is thus:
P (ω = b|ez) = P (z = ez|ω = b)P (ω = b)
P (z = ez) . (3.13)
A ‘good’ state is more likely to prevail given the submitted evidence if P (z = ez|ω = g) >
P (z = ez|ω = b).
Under the adversarial system, only four outcomes are possible on the equilibrium path:
no evidence is submitted, party F only submits a ‘good’ piece of evidence, party E only
submits a ‘bad’ piece of evidence, or both party F and party E submit ’good’ and ’bad’
pieces respectively.
Under the inquisitorial system more outcomes are possible on the equilibrium path: no
evidence submitted, party F does not submit any evidence and at the same time party E
submits either one or two pieces of evidence, party F submits a ‘good’ piece of evidence and
at the same time party E does not submit any evidence or submits one piece of evidence
(either ‘good’ or ‘bad’) or two pieces of evidence.
We now check that in all the instances the decision of theDM described above constitutes
an equilibrium.
Two pieces of evidence are submitted Note that once both pieces of evidence are
submitted, independently of who submitted which piece of evidence, the probability of the
good state is more likely if fg > fb, i.e. if, and only if, z ∈ Zg. To gain further intuition of
this result, consider the case when E and F each submit one piece of evidence.
Suppose that F submits only x and E submits only y, i.e. ezF = (x, ∅) while ezE = (∅, y),
where x ∈ Xg, y ∈ Y b and z ∈ Zg.
1. Consider first the inquisitorial system.
The evidence submitted suggests that event 2 (conflicting but overall favorable evidence)
is realized. The probability of such realization in ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states is given by fg and
fb respectively. E submits a ‘bad’ piece of evidence only in the case she acquired only this
evidence (this happens with probability αe∗E). F submits a ‘good’ piece of evidence either
in the case she found only this piece of evidence (with probability αe∗F (1+ s)) or in the case
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she found two pieces of evidence (with probability αe∗F ).
Therefore the conditional probabilities of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states are:
P (z = ez|ω = g) = fg(z)(2 + s)α2e∗F e∗E (3.14)
P (z = ez|ω = b) = fb(z)(2 + s)2α2e∗F e∗E. (3.15)








2. Consider now the adversarial system. The behavior of F is the same under the
adversarial system as under the inquisitorial system. However, E submits a ‘bad’ piece of
evidence either if she acquired only this piece of evidence (with probability (1 + s)αe∗E) or if
she acquired two pieces of evidence (with probability αe∗E). The corresponding conditional
probabilities are thus given by:
P (z = ez|ω = g) = fg(z)(2 + s)2α2e∗F e∗E (3.17)
P (z = ez|ω = b) = fb(z)(2 + s)2α2e∗F e∗E. (3.18)








Proof. As fg(z ∈ Zg) > fb(z ∈ Zg) by definition,the inequalities (3.16) and (3.19) hold.
Due to the fact that the probabilities of submitting z in both states are equal, it is the
joint density of z that determines which state is more likely.
The proof is identical for all the other cases when the submission strategies by parties
lead to two pieces of evidence being revealed.
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Therefore, we would further consider only partial submission cases.
One piece of evidence submitted a) We first consider the case when F submits a ‘good’
evidence and E submits nothing, i.e. ezF = (x, ∅) while ezE = (∅, ∅), where x ∈ Xg.
Let us denote by pj,ω,x and pj,ω,y the probabilities of event j = 1, ..., 4, conditional on
being in state of nature ω and for a given realization of, respectively, x or y.
1. The conditional probabilities of each state under inquisitorial system are given by:
P (x|ω = g) = gg(x)(1− 3αe∗E)αe∗F [(1 + s) + p2,g,x] (3.20)
P (x|ω = b) = gb(x)(1− 3αe∗E)αe∗F [(1 + s) + p2,b,x]. (3.21)
F submits one ‘good’ piece of evidence if:
i) she acquired only 1 piece of evidence and this evidence was ‘good’ (with probability
(1 + s)αe∗F )
ii) she acquired two pieces of evidence and the second piece was ‘bad’ but the evidence
is overall favorable to F (with probability αe∗Fp2,g,x). Recall that F does not submit any
evidence if she acquires two pieces of evidence that are ‘good’ and if she acquires two pieces
of evidence that are overall unfavorable to her.
E at the same time does not submit any evidence, only if she does not indeed acquire
any evidence (with probability (1− 3αe∗E))
DM rules of favour of F if following inequality is satisfied:
gg(x)(1− 3αe∗E)αe∗F [(1 + s) + p2,g,x] > gb(x)(1− 3αe∗E)αe∗F [(1 + s) + p2,b,x]. (3.22)
2. The corresponding probabilities under the adversarial system are given by:
P (x|ω = g) = (3.23)
gg(x)[αe
∗
F ((1 + s) + p2,g,x)(1− (p2,g,x + p3,g,x)(2 + s)αe∗E)]
P (x|ω = b) = (3.24)
gb(x)[αe
∗
F ((1 + s) + p2,b,x)(1− (p2,b,x + p3,b,x)(2 + s)αe∗E)].
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Under the adversarial system, F submission strategy is unchanged. However, E does not
submit any evidence in more instances: when she obtained either nothing or a ‘good’ piece of
evidence (with probability(1−(p2,b,x+p3,b,x)(2+s)αe∗E)). Note that p2,ω,x+p3,ω,x = 1−p1,ω,x
DM rules of favour of F if the following inequality is satisfied:
gg(x)[αe
∗
F ((1 + s) + p2,g,x)(1− (1− p1,g,x)(2 + s)αe∗E)] (3.25)
> gb(x)[αe
∗
F ((1 + s) + p2,b,x)(1− (1− p1,g,x)(2 + s)αe∗E)].
Proof. given that x ∈ Xg implies gg(x) > gb(x),together with p1,g,x < p1,b,x and p2,g,x >
p2,b,x, inequalities (3.22) and (3.25) are satisfied.
b) We now analyze the case when E submits one ‘bad’ piece of evidence and F submits





E[1− (2 + s)αe∗F + p3,g,xαe∗F + p4,g,x(1 + (2 + s)αe∗F )] (3.26)
< gb(x)αe
∗





E((1− p1,g,x)(1− (2 + s)αe∗F ) + p3,g,xαe∗F ) + 3(1 + s)αe∗Ep4,g,x]
< gb(x)[(2 + s)αe
∗
E((1− p1,g,x)(1− (2 + s)αe∗F ) + p3,b,xαe∗F ) + 3(1 + s)αe∗Ep4,b,x].
Proof. Inequalities (3.26) and (3.27) are satisfied, as p4,g,x < p4,b,x, and p3,g,x < p3,b,x.
c) Under the inquisitorial system we are still left with two outcomes to analyze:
1. E submits ‘good’ evidence and F submits nothing, i.e. ezF = (∅, ∅) while ezE =
(x, ∅),where x ∈ Xg.
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2. Both F and E submit ‘good’ evidence.
However, we can observe that if m = 1 constitutes equilibrium in the first case, then it
should constitute equilibrium in the second case as well, as it is more likely in the second
case that the true state is ‘good’.
Therefore, we are only left with the first case to analyze.
DM indeed rules in favour of F if, and only if:
gg(x)αe
∗
E[1− (2 + s)αe∗F + p1,g,x(1− (2 + 3s)αe∗F ) + p3,g,xαe∗F )] (3.28)
> gb(x)αe
∗
E[(1− (2 + s)αe∗F ) + p1,b,x(1− (2 + 3s)αe∗F ) + p3,b,xαe∗F )].
Proof. After several algebraic manipulations, one can show that the above inequality is
satisfied as:
i) (p1,g,x− p1,b,x)(1− (2+ 3s)αe∗F ) > (p3,b,x− p3,g,x)αe∗F as (p1,g,x− p1,b,x) > (p3,b,x− p3,g,x)
ii)(1− (2 + 3s)αe∗F ) > αe∗F as (1 + s)α ≤ 13 by the assumption.
Off-equilibrium path and trembling hand criterion
We now consider out-of-equilibrium behavior.
When faced with an unexpected event, the DM believes that a party made a mistake
(per piece of evidence mistakenly submitted) with probability ǫ.
Consider the outcome in which F submits only a ‘bad’ piece of evidence while E submits
nothing, i.e. ezF = (x, ∅) while zE = (∅, ∅),where x ∈ Xb. The DM then disallows the merger
iff:
1. Under the inquisitorial system the following should be true:
gb(x)(1− 3αe∗E))α(1− s)e∗F ǫ(1 + p4,b,x) (3.29)
> gg(x)(1− 3e∗E))α(1− s)e∗F ǫ(1 + p4,g,x).
Since x ∈ Xb, events 2, 3 and 4 are the only relevant ones. In case y ∈ Y g, it cannot be
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the case that F observed it, for otherwise it would have submitted it. Thus, since ezF = (x, ∅)
it must be the case that persuader F acquired only x (with probability (1− s)αe∗F ), or both
x and y in the event 4 (with probability 2(1− s)αe∗F ) and made a submission mistake with
probability ǫ. Since we also have that zE = (∅, ∅), then E did not succeed in acquiring
information, which happens with probability (1− 3αe∗E).
Inequality (3.29) holds since p4,b,x > p4,g,x when x ∈ Xb. It can be easily shown that
all the other scenarios in which a submission mistake could occur work in a similar manner
under the inquisitorial system.
2.Under the adversarial system, the submission of such evidence can occur only in the
event 2, 3 and 4. In the event 1, only ‘good’ evidence is realized.
F submits a bad piece of evidence in the events 2 and 3 if she has found only this piece
of evidence and made a mistake in submitting it (with probability (1− s)αe∗F ǫ), and in the
event 4, if she has found either only one or both pieces of evidence (probability 3(1−s)αe∗F ǫ).
E, on the other hand, does not submit any evidence under the adversarial system either
if she acquired nothing or if she acquired ‘good’ evidence. In the events 2 and 3, E would
acquire no evidence or a ‘good’ evidence with the probability (1− αe∗E(2 + s)). In the event
4, E submits nothing only if she indeed acquires nothing which happens with a relatively
low probability under the adversarial system, 1− 3(1− s)αe∗E.
Replacing (p2,ω,x + p3,ω,x) by (1 − p4,ω,x) one can express the corresponding conditional
probabilities for each state as:
P (x|ω = b) = (3.30)
gb(x)(1− s)αe∗F ǫ[(1− αe∗E(2 + s)) + p4,b,x((2− (7 + 8s)αe∗E))
P (x|ω = g) = (3.31)
gg(x)(1− s)αe∗F ǫ[(1− αe∗E(2 + s)) + p4,g,x((2− (7 + 8s)αe∗E)).
Thus, P (x|ω = b) is greater than P (x|ω = g) only (2 − (7 + 8s)αe∗E) ≥ 0, i.e. for
e∗E ≤ 2α(7+8s) . Otherwise, P (x|ω = g) > P (x|ω = b).
This result appears to be quite intuitive, as for a high equilibrium effort of E, the prob-
ability of finding nothing in the event 4 is very small, and thus event 4 is highly unlikely to
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be realized, conditional on the fact that E did not acquire any evidence. Therefore, in this
case, events 2 and 3 are more likely. Given that (p2,g,x + p3,g,x) > (p2,b,x + p3,b,x), the ‘good’
state is more likely than the ‘bad’ state.
For the low enough E’s equilibrium level of effort, the probability of E not obtaining any
evidence is higher and the conditional probability of the event 4 is higher than of the events
2 and 3. In this case, the ‘bad’ state is more likely to prevail than the ‘good’ state.
B: Example of joint distribution
The first piece of evidence, x, is drawn from a countable setX ∈ {−∞, .,−n, ..−2,−1, 1, ., n, .,∞}
with marginal probability gω(x) = p + 2ε(x,ω). The second piece of evidence, y, is drawn
from a countable set Y ∈ {−∞,∞} with marginal probability hω(y) = p+ 2ε(y,ω),
where:
ε(x,ω) =
εx for x > 0 and for ω = g
−ε|x| for x < 0 and for ω = g
−εx for x > 0 and for ω = b





x=−∞(px + 2ε(x,ω)) = 1. Similar properties apply to ε(y,ω).
According to our assumptions x ∈ Xg (respectively, x ∈ Xb) if gg(x) > gb(x) (respec-
tively, gg(x) < gb(x)) and in this case x is referred to as ‘good’ (respectively, ‘bad’). Similar
dichotomies apply to Y and Z. In our example x ∈ Xg, if x > 0 and y ∈ Y g if y > 0.
Otherwise, x ∈ Xb and y ∈ Y g.
z ∈ Zg if both x and y are positive or if x > 0 and y < 0 and x > |y| or if x < 0 and
y > 0 andy > |x|.
z ∈ Zb if both x and y are negative or if x > 0 and y < 0 and x < |y| or if x < 0 and
y > 0 andy < |x|.
The joint pdf is given by fω(x, y) =ω (x) ∗ hω(y).
The probability that both x and y are ‘good’ (event 1 ) in each state is given by:
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Finally, the probability that evidence is conflicting but overall ‘bad’ (event 3 ) in each





















Consider a following numerical example:
let p = (1
2






)x+1 + 2( 1
10
)x for x > 0
(1
2
)x+1 − 2( 1
10





)x+1 − 2( 1
10
)x for x > 0
(1
2
)x+1 + 2( 1
10
)|x| for x < 0
(3.38)
This distribution generates the joint distribution that is consistent with our assumptions,
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i.e:




p4,g = p1,b =
25
324
p2,g = p3,b =
95
324




C: Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
The level of precision of the DM ’s decision
1. s = 0






Thus, the total costs are higher under the adversarial system for a given level of eE. For
s = 0, the difference in the level of precision of the final decision, or in the expected loss from




L(1 + 2α(eIF − 2eAF ))(p2,g − p2,b). (3.41)







. As e∗IF is always higher than e
∗A
F , the smallest
value it can take is equal to e∗AF . If condition (3.41) is not satisfied for the smallest value of
e∗IF , then it will not be satisfied for any other values of e
∗I
F . Thus, the above inequality can





As the smallest value that α can take is 1
3
, this inequality is satisfied only for the values
of e∗AF greater than 1. Therefore, the adversarial system generates lower expected loss for
e∗AF > 1. Note that e
∗A
F represents the probability in our set-up, and therefore cannot exceed
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one by definition. This concludes the proof that for s = 0, the adversarial system generates
strictly lower DM ’s payoff than the inquisitorial system.
2. Using an Envelope Theorem and differentiating (3.6) with respect to s establishes that
the level of precision of final decision under the adversarial system is increasing in s, and
for s = 1 is higher under the adversarial system than under the inquisitorial.
Comparison of DM ’s payoff
The proof is divided into two parts. We first show that at s ≥ bs and Π sufficiently low the
adversarial system is superior to the inquisitorial system. We then show that for values of Π
such that e∗IF = 1 the adversarial system is superior to the inquisitorial system, followed by
a demonstration that there exists intermediate values of Π, for which this result is reversed.






F and eE = e
∗I
E for both
systems. After several algebraic manipulations the difference in the DM ’s payoff inder two













Note that for the adversarial system eE is not the optimal level of effort. Therefore, if
the payoff under the adversarial system is higher than under the inquisitorial system at the
suboptimal level of E’s effort, this result will be reinforced at the optimal E’s level for the
adversarial system.
1. At s ≥ bs and Π = 0, this difference is strictly positive as αe∗IF = 0 while e∗IE > 0.
At the same time, the difference in the DM ’s expected loss and the difference in associated
costs increase in Π as both e∗IE and e
∗I
F increase in Π. Given the continuity of the DM ’s loss
function, it must be the case that at least for the small enough values of Π the adversarial
system generates higher DM ’s payoff.
Consider nowΠ large enough that both e∗AF = e
∗I
F = 1. Then the difference in the expected
payoff of the DM under the two systems is given by:
1
2
αLe∗IE [3(p1,g − p1,b)s− (p2,g − p2,b)(1− α((2 + s)2 − 2))], (3.44)
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which is always greater than zero for s ≥ bs. Therefore, for Π large enough the adversarial
system dominates the inquisitorial system.






F and eE = e
∗A
E
for both systems. For a given eE, e
∗A
F increases faster with Π than e
∗I
F , and therefore e
∗A
F
reaches the value of one for lower values of Π than e∗IF .
From Lemma 2, it follows that for e∗AF = 1, e
∗A
E does not depend on e
∗A
E and therefore on
Π.
From what follows, that for Π such that e∗AF = 1 and e
∗I
F < 1 the difference between




αLe∗AE [3(p1,g − p1,b)s− (p2,g − p2,b)(1− α((2 + s)2 − 2αe∗IF ))]−
1
2
[1− (αe∗IF )2]. (3.45)
Note that the difference in expected loss is increasing and linear in e∗IF , while the difference
in costs is increasing and convex in e∗IF . Given that for e
∗I
F = 0 and s ≥ bs the difference in the
expected cost is greater than the difference in costs, then there exists Π such that e∗AF = 1
and e∗IF < 1 where the two curves cross.
D: Proof of Proposition 4 on endogenous allocation of
the burden of proof
In Appendix A we have considered the cases of the full or partial submission of the evidence,
maintaining the exogenous decision rule in the favor of F in the case when no evidence
are submitted. We now check whether or not such a decision can arise as an equilibrium
outcome.
Using the same reasoning as described above, the corresponding conditional probability
of each state is given by:
1. Inquisitorial system:
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P (z = ∅|ω = g) = (3.46)
(1− 3αe∗E)[1− p1,g 2αe∗F (1 + s)− p2,gαe∗F (1 + s)− p3,gαe∗F (2 + s)]
P (z = ∅|ω = b) = (3.47)
(1− 3αe∗E)[1− p1,b 2αe∗F (1 + s)− p2,bαe∗F (1 + s)− p3,bαe∗F (2 + s)]
p1,g 2αe
∗
F (1 + s) + p2,gαe
∗
F (1 + s) + p3,gαe
∗
F (2 + s) (3.48)
< p1,b 2αe
∗
F (1 + s) + p2,bαe
∗
F (1 + s) + p3,bαe
∗
F (2 + s)
αe∗F (1 + s) + p1,g αe
∗




F (1 + s) + p1,b αe
∗




P (z = ∅|ω = g) = (3.50)
1− p1,g2α(1 + s)e∗F − p4,g3α(1 + s)e∗E − p2,gα(2 + s)(e∗E + e∗F − α(2 + s)e∗F e∗E)
−p3,gα(eF (1 + s) + e∗E(2 + s)− αe∗F e∗E(1 + s)(2 + s))
P (z = ∅|ω = b) = (3.51)
1− p1,b2α(1 + s)e∗F − p4,b3α(1 + s)e∗E − p2,bα(2 + s)(e∗E + e∗F − α(2 + s)e∗F e∗E)
−p3,bα(e∗F (1 + s) + e∗E(2 + s)− αe∗F e∗E(1 + s)(2 + s))
P (z = ∅|ω = g) > P (z = ∅|ω = b) if
(p1,g − p4,g)(1 + s)(3e∗E − 2e∗F ) > (p2,g − p3,g)((e∗F − αe∗F e∗E(2 + s)). (3.52)
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Inequality (3.52) is satisfied if e∗E > e
∗
F , or more precisely if
e∗E >
p2,g − p3,g





which occurs for Π sufficiently low and/or L sufficiently large.
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